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ABSTRACT 
 
There is little consensus about the scope of the President’s powers to cure breaches of 
U.S. treaty obligations, let alone the influence of decisions by international tribunals finding the 
United States in breach.  Such decisions do not appear to be directly effective under U.S. law.  
Treaties and statutes address questions of domestic authority sporadically and incompletely, and 
are suited to the task only if construed heroically; the President’s general constitutional authority 
relating to foreign affairs is sometimes invoked, but its extent is uncertain and turns all too little 
on the underlying law at issue.  Relying on either theory to cope with breaches, accordingly, risks 
distorting the positive law or vesting the President with a potentially boundless authority – or, in 
the alternative, risks a recurring gap between our international obligations and our domestic law. 
 
The Take Care Clause affords a surprisingly well-tailored solution.  Take care authority 
has been neglected in recent discourse, and not without reason.  On the one hand, it is not obvious 
that it encompasses treaties, or licenses presidential authority beyond the capacity to ensure 
compliance within the executive branch; on the other hand, it smacks of unbridled executive 
power.  These objections can be met.  As the Article explains, the Take Care Clause includes 
treaties, including – critically – some treaties conventionally labeled as non-self-executing, and 
permits presidential authority beyond self-regulation.  The text, case law, and practice further 
support the idea that this authority may be divested by the Constitution, by treaty, or by statute, 
and must satisfy additional criteria that guard against vesting the president with plenary 
lawmaking authority.   
 
The Article explains how this theory applies to potential controversies involving 
compliance with the decisions of international tribunals (like those of the International Court of 
Justice, or arising under the WTO or the Law of the Sea Convention), legislative decisions by 
institutions like the Security Council (such as a resolution enabling war crime proceedings against 
former U.S. officials), and finally treaties that afford no recourse to international mechanisms.  
The result is a theory that reinforces congressional supremacy without requiring that treaty 
obligations founder upon it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose the United States breaches a treaty, and Congress does nothing.  
(Regrettably, this may not be too difficult to imagine.)  What can the President do, 
besides withdraw from the treaty?  How is the President’s authority affected if the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or some other international institution has confirmed 
the breach, and prescribed a remedy? 
President Bush’s controversial attempt to order compliance with an ICJ judgment 
against the United States revived these questions,1 but they transcend that dispute.  Three 
answers have been especially prominent.  Some contend that ICJ judgments – and 
perhaps other international decisions – are automatically enforceable under U.S. law, 
such that presidential authority is surplusage.2  Others indicate that the President’s 
foreign affairs powers confer sufficient authority, such that involvement of an ICJ 
                                                 
† Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School.  Earlier versions received 
helpful comments from participants at the Duke-Harvard Foreign Relations Law Workshop and the 
Potomac Foreign Relations Law Roundtable at George Washington University; I would particularly like to 
thank Curt Bradley, John Harrison, Michael Van Alstine, and Carlos Vázquez.   
While Counselor on International Law at the U.S. State Department from 2005-2006, I was 
involved with the briefing of cases discussed here, but the views expressed are solely my own. 
1 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales (Feb. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter Presidential Memorandum], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html; see Case Concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena]. 
2 See, e.g., Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 8, Medellín v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398, 2007 WL 120779 (April 30, 2007) (No. 06-984) (arguing that 
Avena “is binding on all courts in the United States and supplies the rule of decision in a state habeas 
petition.”).  Some leading scholars expressed comparable views at an earlier juncture when a provisional 
measure of less definite force was at issue.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty 
Obligations, and the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1998) (arguing that the ICJ order was binding and had 
the status of a self-executing treaty obligation); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to 
Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 686 (1998) (arguing 
that if the ICJ order was binding, it had the status of self-executing federal law). 
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judgment (or even an international agreement) is helpful but not strictly necessary.3  A 
third view suggests that only legislative intervention will suffice, such that international 
decisions, international agreements, and presidential authority may all be for naught.4  
This third view has prevailed to date in recent litigation,5 and there is reason to 
think that it may also prevail in the longer term.  A recent case dealt a body blow to the 
notion that ICJ decisions are directly authoritative within the United States, treating them 
instead as entitled to “respectful consideration” – something closer to the wry “all due 
respect.”6  And while the President’s foreign affairs power enjoyed several victories at 
the Rehnquist Court’s close,7 there remains considerable (and appropriate) skepticism 
about it,8 and the judicial tide may be turning.9 
Congressional exclusivity, the last theory standing, is not overly kind to 
international obligations, and even its fidelity to domestic principles is dubious.  Some 
treaties are not supposed to require anything more before they are fully effective as 
domestic law.10  Congressional skepticism toward international law and institutions, 
moreover, suggests that legislative supervision may be hard to come by,11 and the 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2006).  The executive branch, unsurprisingly, has also endorsed this view.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 29-32 (discussing U.S. submission in Medellín litigation).  Some who might ordinarily 
support a broad construction of the President’s foreign affairs powers have misgivings about doing so, 
however, when it trenches on state sovereignty.  See infra text accompanying note 39 (noting submission 
by academic amici in recent litigation).  
4 See, e.g., Michael Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 309 (2006). 
5 Ex Parte Medellín, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (dismissing application for 
writ of habeas corpus), cert. granted, Medellín v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398, 2007 WL 120779 (April 30, 
2007) (No. 06-984) [hereinafter Ex Parte Medellín]. 
6 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006). 
7 See American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
8 E.g., Van Alstine, supra note 4, passim; Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American 
Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 825 (2004); cf. Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty 
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000) (attributing narrower dormant foreign relations authority to the treaty 
power). 
9 See, e.g, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793-98 (2006) (plurality opinion) (rejecting, 
without mention of deference, the executive branch’s treaty interpretation). 
10 Indeed, some treaties may accomplish ends that conventional legislative authority could not.  
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431-32 (1920). 
11 Witness, for example, Congress’ part in the long-running battle over U.N. dues.  Britta A. 
Schnoor, Note, International Law, the Power of the Purse, and Speaking with One Voice: The Legal 
Cacophony Created by Withholding U.S. Dues from the United Nations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1133 (2007) 
(describing history of disputes, including Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005).  
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superiority of later-in-time statutes over treaties as a matter of domestic (but not 
international) law means that every attempt at congressional compliance risks legislating 
further deviation from our international obligations.12  This is not to say that other two 
theories are better.  Granting conclusive authority to international institutions may be 
worrisome as a matter of law and democratic accountability;13 the President is more 
accountable, but recognizing a right to implement foreign policy objectives, without 
making law fundamental to the claim, creates a lot of power to account for.  The problem 
is that congressional exclusivity will either let international obligations wither on the vine 
or encourage extravagant claims about the scope of authority Congress previously 
delegated, effectively undermining any commitment to legislative supremacy.14  
Is that all there is?  A fourth possibility, hinging on the President’s responsibility 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”15 has been advanced only half-
heartedly.  This is somewhat surprising.  The argument has a textual hook, and take care 
authority has sometimes been put in capacious terms.16  Its limitations may be substantive 
in character, or they may have more to do with the lack of a sponsor: those wary of 
presidential power, those wary of limits on presidential power, and those enthusiastic 
about internationalist alternatives may all lack enthusiasm for half-way measures.  
Whatever the explanation, there is little sustained examination of the argument, and 
waning support for its salience;17 its use in litigation to date understandably does little to 
confront its problems, and thus little to promote its serious consideration.  
                                                 
12 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that, if legislation and a self-
executing treaty provision cannot be reconciled, the later in time prevails); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(b) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] 
(“That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic 
law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of 
that obligation.”).  
13 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 34, 36; see 
also Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 
1496-97 (2004) (citing leading critics of international authority). 
14 See also infra text accompanying note 191 (noting breadth of potential presumptions and 
constructions). 
15 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
16 See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (suggesting that the take care authority extended to 
“the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the constitution itself, our international relations, and all 
the protection implied by the nature of the government under the constitution”); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 70-75 (discussing In re Neagle and like authority). 
17 See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 4, at 331-37 (critiquing argument as one facet of a broader 
movement favoring executive power).  Professor Van Alstine, I should note, seems to come to the opposite 
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This Article fills the gap.  Clarifying the relevance of the Take Care Clause is 
challenging, and the answers are far from obvious.  But some of the threshold questions 
that get posed – such as whether treaties fall within the “Laws” triggering executive 
authority, or whether the Clause is solely a reminder to the President to abide by the law 
– may be put to rest.  When properly qualified, moreover, take care authority provides a 
defensible vision of constitutionally legitimate intervention by the President to fulfill our 
international obligations.   
Part I uses the controversy surrounding the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR) to illustrate tensions in the conventional account of presidential 
authority for treaty compliance.  Part II establishes the general parameters under the Take 
Care Clause, explaining how it vests the President with the authority to execute treaties, 
including some that may conventionally be regarded as non-self-executing, with binding 
domestic legal effect.  As is stressed, this authority is defeasible, meaning that it is 
subject to ex ante restraint by treaty-makers (and the Constitution) and ex post restraint 
by Congress.  Part III extends that analysis to circumstances involving ICJ judgments that 
are binding under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, then discusses the implications for other 
kinds of international decisions, Security Council resolutions, and finally treaties that 
lack any such intervention.  The result is a theory that reaffirms executive branch 
authority to compel compliance with international obligations, but under a limited set of 
                                                                                                                                                 
conclusion about the take care argument’s prevalence.  Id. at 332 & n. 151 (asserting that “the near 
consensus view among modern scholars holds that the President’s Take Care Clause duties broadly extend 
to the domestic enforcement of international law in general . . . Not surprisingly, this consensus view also 
prevails in the specific circumstances that gave rise to the present administration's assertion of a unilateral 
authority to enforce a decision of the ICJ.”); e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 111 cmt. c 
(“That international law and agreements of the United States are law of the United States means also that 
the President has the obligation and the necessary authority to take care that they be faithfully executed.”).  
There are several possible explanations for the difference in judgment.  One is that the sources he cites are 
all of a certain vintage (namely, 1984-1987); another is that they were focused on the problem of 
presidential law-breaking, rather than law-implementing; a third is that several covered the waterfront 
concerning reasons for compliance, rather than focusing on a take-care basis, as here.  See also Vázquez, 
supra note 2, at 686 (“[E]ven if the treaty-based duty to comply with ICJ orders were judicially 
unenforceable . . . there would remain the President's authority to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed’ . . . If the courts lacked the authority to enforce the ICJ Order, then the President himself could 
have issued an executive order postponing Breard's execution.”).  In the final analysis, though, whatever 
consensus there may have been has not re-emerged in the present controversy, see infra Part I (discussing 
Medellin litigation), nor have its difficulties (such as the challenge presented by non-self-executing treaties) 
been explored.    
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circumstances, and while preserving superior authority for Congress and a substantial 
role for the federal courts.   
A few methodological points are in order.  First, the Article assumes, without 
justifying, a conventional approach to constitutional interpretation – using text, practice, 
and case law – because the questions of why this argument may be resisted, and how it 
might fare, are interesting and important.  Second, it does not attempt to evaluate all the 
advantages and disadvantages of rival bases for enforcing international obligations.18  
Finally, the Article solely concerns treaties and, in particular, focuses on reconciling 
presidential orders and international decisions (both broadly construed).19  This said, it is 
relevant to broader debates regarding the scope of the President’s take care authority, in 
the foreign relations context and otherwise.20 
I. THE PRESIDENT’S PREDICAMENT 
Interest in the President’s authority to order compliance with international law – 
rather than, for once, the old perennial of the President’s authority to disobey 
international law21 – has been revived by the repeated violation of U.S. obligations under 
the VCCR by state and local law enforcement officials.  The nature of those violations – 
which may control that case’s outcome – is not particular material to the more general 
question, but they involved foreign nationals who were detained by state officials and not 
advised of their right to communicate with their consulates.  This drew international 
attention after some of those nationals were sentenced to death – and eventually resulted 
                                                 
18 But see infra text accompanying notes 186-197. 
19 “Presidential order” and “international decision” are meant to include binding pronouncements, 
rendered (respectively) by the President or an international dispute resolution process, in matters directly 
concerning the United States.  The term “treaty” is meant to focus on international agreements submitted 
for Senate advice and consent; the same analysis applies, for the most part, to congressional-executive 
agreements, though these may fit uneasily with originalist premises. 
20 For a compatible perspective, but without focus on treaties, see Jack Goldsmith & John F. 
Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006).  Significantly, Professors 
Goldsmith and Manning do not resolve whether the “completion power” they posit stems from the Take 
Care Clause or some other source.  Id. at 2303-04. 
21 See, e.g., Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004); Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law? (pts. 1 & 2), 
80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987); Panel Session, The Authority of the United 
States Executive To Interpret, Articulate or Violate the Norms of International Law, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 297 (1986). 
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in several ICJ decisions confirming that the United States, through its states, had 
breached the VCCR.22     
The executive branch initially limited itself to seeking cooperation from the states, 
arguing that executive power was limited and that intervention by federal courts would be 
inappropriate.23  As the ICJ judgments grew increasingly stringent – culminating in the 
Avena decision, which required the United States to provide “review and reconsideration 
of the convictions and sentences of the [covered] Mexican nationals”24 – this strategy 
seemed increasingly untenable.  Eventually, on the eve of further proceedings in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, President Bush issued a memorandum to the Attorney General.  After 
noting the treaties to which the United States was party, the memorandum stated: 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as 
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
America, that the United States will discharge its inter-national 
obligations under the [Avena] decision . . . by having State courts 
give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles 
of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in 
that decision.25 
This memorandum tried to bring the controversy to a close – together with the 
U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol26 – but it succeeded only in raising more 
questions, almost all of which are germane to other disputes.  Assuming the President 
                                                 
22 See Avena, supra note 1; LaGrand (FRG v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9). 
23 See Mark J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, the Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1185 (2006); Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 
AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1998); e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 
U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390 & 97-8214) (“The ‘measures at [the United States’] disposal’ under our 
constitution may in some cases include only persuasion – such as the Secretary of State’s request to the 
Governor of Virginia to delay Breard’s execution – and not legal compulsion through the judicial system.  
That is the situation here.”). 
24 Avena, supra note 1, at ¶ 153(9).  The ICJ added further detail, including that this “review and 
reconsideration” would be conducted by courts and not limited by procedural default rules, so as to allow 
assessment of the “full weight of the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention” and a case-
by-case evaluation of actual prejudice.  determination made as to whether the violation “caused actual 
prejudice to the defendant in the process of the administration of criminal justice.”  Id. at ¶¶ 107-114, 138-
141.  . 
25 See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 1.    
26 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 324, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; 
see Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (Mar. 7, 
2005), http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2005/101_200/186E.doc. 
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intended to bind state courts,27 there remained the question of how he could.  The allusion 
to the President’s constitutional authority and “the laws of the United States of America” 
left unstated which provisions were being invoked.  The memorandum alluded in passing 
to the VCCR and the Optional Protocol, but those sources may have been invoked less as 
bases for action than as reasons for acting – motivations for presidential action that was 
legally founded, if at all, on other grounds.  The Supreme Court cited the memorandum in 
remanding for state court proceedings the case of Jose Ernesto Medellín, one of the 
Mexican nationals at issue before the ICJ, whose VCCR claim had been procedurally 
defaulted.28  The Court did not, however, reach any decision concerning the 
memorandum’s source of authority, and left open the possibility that it lacked any 
authority whatsoever.   
In state court, the United States invoked the President’s “constitutionally based 
foreign affairs powers”29 and “his authority under the United Nations Participation Act 
and by virtue of the United States’ ratification of the United Nations Charter.”30  It 
described Article 94 of the Charter as creating a legal and political obligation, insofar as 
non-compliance involved recourse to the Security Council; given the President’s 
responsibility for exercising the U.S. vote in the Council, this suggested that the 
President’s wishes were paramount.31  Consistent with that view, it argued that 
individuals could not themselves invoke directly the Avena decision or the VCCR.32  
Medellín, naturally, argued that courts could rely directly on the VCCR and the Avena 
decision as binding federal law.33  But he simultaneously seconded the broad view of 
presidential authority, emphasizing the President’s treaty-making and foreign affairs 
                                                 
27 Arguably it was more consistent with the memorandum’s form, the notion of comity, and 
principles of federalism to consider it non-binding.  The states made just such an argument in the Medellín 
litigation, see State’s Brief in Response at 34-38, Ex Parte José Ernesto Medellín, No. AP-75,207 (Tex. Ct. 
Crim. App.), and one judge agreed.  Ex Parte Medellín, supra note 5, * 29 (Cochran, J., concurring) 
(stressing that the presidential memorandum “looks much more like a memo than a law” and lacked legal 
effect).  But a plurality assumed that it was binding.  Id. * 9. 
28 Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2090 (2005) (per curiam). 
29 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Ex Parte Medellín, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. 
Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (No. AP-75,207) [hereinafter U.S. Ex Parte Medellin Brief]. 
30 Id. at 14. 
31 Id. at 18, 20-21, 44-45. 
32 Id. at 34-49. 
33 Brief of Applicant José Ernesto Medellín at 36-44, Ex Parte Medellín, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. 
Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (No. AP-75,207). 
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powers,34 the binding nature of the determination in its own right,35 the need to ensure 
U.S. effectiveness in international affairs and to protect Americans abroad,36 and lastly 
the President’s “authority and duty” to enforce the U.S. treaty obligations in the domestic 
sphere.37  The State of Texas agreed with the U.S. government as to the unenforceability 
of Avena and the VCCR, but disagreed as to the presidential determination – which, if 
binding, exceeded the President’s foreign affairs authority.38  State amici noted that the 
U.S. government had never acquiesced in the ICJ’s reading of the treaty, meaning that 
“[w]hat the President is requiring the state courts to exercise – if he is requiring them to 
do anything at all – is his own policy decision that the state courts should do as the ICJ 
has asked,” something that amounted more to lawmaking.39 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wound up rejecting all the arguments for 
relief.40  A plurality had a simple response to the Take Care Clause.  Since the Supreme 
Court had already concluded that ICJ decisions were only entitled to “respectful 
consideration,” the President’s attempt to direct state courts to give effect to Avena 
necessarily meant that “the President has acted as a lawmaker”41 – contrary to Justice 
                                                 
34 Id. at 33-36.  
35 Id. at 45. 
36 Id. at 46-49. 
37 Id. at 50. 
38 State’s Brief in Response at 39-40, Ex Parte Medellín, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 
2006) (No. AP-75,207); see also Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14, Ex Parte Medellín, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 
2006) (No. AP-75,207) (“No enumerated power in Article II of the U.S. Constitution authorizes such a 
mandatory order, and the President’s ‘inherent’ power over foreign affairs has never been stretched so 
thin.”). 
39 Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent at 15, Ex Parte Medellín, 2006 WL 3302639 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (No. AP-75,207). 
40  According to the court, Sanchez-Llamas compelled the conclusion that Avena was not binding 
federal law, and thus could not preempt the relevant provisions of the Texas habeas statute.  Ex Parte 
Medellín, supra note 5, * 7.  A four-judge plurality regarded the memorandum’s attempt to create a 
domestic “analog” to Avena as an unconstitutional attempt to “dictate to the judiciary what law to apply or 
how to interpret the applicable law” (id. *10), and rejected appeal to any “inherent foreign affairs power” 
(id. *11) because the memorandum was “’incompatible with the . . . implied will of Congress’” and thus at 
the “’lowest ebb’” of presidential authority.  Id. *16 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 
637 (Jackson, J., concurring)) – although it would apparently have permitted resolution via an executive 
agreement with Mexico.  Id. *17.  Citing the U.N. Charter and its related statutes was thought to add little, 
probably because they did not license the types of action – and domestic legal consequences – asserted in 
the memorandum.  Id. ** 19-21. 
41 Id. * 18. 
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Black’s admonition in Youngstown Sheet & Tube that “the President’s power to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”42 
The pattern should repeat itself in the Supreme Court, reinforcing the sense that 
the Take Care Clause plays a bit part in debates over presidential authority.  Medellín has 
again pressed every possible theory for recovery, including the idea that the President has 
take care authority – but argues that the President is executing the Avena decision itself, 
which is not a treaty, and which Medellín is convinced is directly effective without need 
of executive assistance.43  On the other hand, the United States – the party entrusted to 
invoke the President’s claim to be exercising the Take Care Clause – does not cite it.44   
 
* * * 
The broad spectrum of Medellín’s theories may be expected, but why the official 
disdain, which may be fatal to redeeming the memorandum on these grounds?  Take care 
authority would be unattractive to the executive branch if it were solely a “duty” as 
opposed to an “authority” – so that it constrains presidential power rather than enhancing 
it.45  At best, the Take Care Clause is both; unlike, say, the general constitutional 
authority over foreign affairs – which in practical terms is wholly elective – the take care 
authority constrains even as it legitimates.  As such, it may grant the President little more 
discretion than would a concession that ICJ judgments require direct, automatic 
enforcement.   
                                                 
42 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), quoted in Ex Parte 
Medellín, supra note 5, * 18. 
43 Brief for Petitioner at 31, Medellín v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398, 2007 WL 120779 (April 30, 
2007) (No. 06-984) (describing the President as choosing “the means by which the United States would 
discharge its obligations under the Avena judgment”); id. at 32-33 (responding to plurality opinion below 
by contending that the President “did not purport to interpret the [VCCR],” but rather “made clear that [the 
United States] disagrees with the result reached in Avena . . . Rather, the President directed that state 
courts, in cases brought before them, apply existing federal treaty law as a means of carry that law” – 
presumably Avena – into effect”).  But see infra text accompanying note 198 (describing approach to 
executing the U.N. Charter, rather than Avena).  Even this was a radical expansion of its discussion in the 
petition, which invoked the Take Care Clause only in arguing that the greater power of concluding an 
executive agreement with Mexico includes the lesser power of ensuring domestic compliance with treaties.  
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22, Medellín v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398, 2007 WL 120779 (April 30, 
2007) (No. 06-984). 
44 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellín v. Texas, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3398, 2007 WL 120779 (April 30, 2007) (No. 06-984) [hereinafter U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief]. 
45 See infra text accompanying notes 115-117. 
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For reasons discussed below in Part II, this constrained discretion is ultimately the 
strength of the argument, but it is not a benefit readily embraced.  As discussed in Part 
III, moreover, the VCCR mess is by no means singular: Other treaties feature dispute 
resolution mechanisms; the Security Council has a lawmaking capacity that vastly 
exceeds its function in enforcing ICJ judgments; and U.S. actors – not only the executive 
branch, but also state governments and the judiciary – will almost certainly breach 
obligations that offer no international recourse, but leave the U.S. reputation for 
compliance tarnished.  Certainly a more exhaustive inquiry into the available theories is 
warranted.  
II. TREATIES AND THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE 
Article II, § 3 provides in relevant part that the President “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”  This sounds good, but its meaning is obscure.  First, what 
exactly are “the Laws”?  Second, what does it mean to “take Care” of them?   Narrow 
answers to these questions have been founded on textual premises, and broader answers 
derived from practice, but the better answer seems to be somewhere in between. 
A. Are (All) Treaties Among “the Laws”? 
The reference in the Take Care Clause to “the Laws” seems, at first blush, 
straightforward: Most of the Constitution’s references to “the law,” “law,” or “Laws” 
relate to congressional statutes.46  But occasionally – even within Article I – “law” 
encompasses federal or state law,47 state law only,48 the law of nations,49 or an ambiguous 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Congress “by law” directs the census); id. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 
(Congress may “by law” regulate elections and “by law” set times of assembly); id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 
(compensation for legislators is to be “ascertained by law”); id. art. I, § 7 (describing presentment and other 
procedures before a bill can become “a law”); id. art. I, § 8 (“uniform Laws” on bankruptcy); id. art. I, § 8 
(enabling Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers and all other Powers”); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting any “ex post facto Law”); id. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 7 (limiting expenditures to those appropriations “made by Law”).  Cf. Bradford R. Clark, 
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1334 (2001) (citing “distinct 
evidence that the term ‘Laws’ in the Supremacy Clause is limited to those ‘Laws’ adopted pursuant to 
Article I, Section 7”). 
47 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (persons impeached and convicted shall be liable and subject to 
other punishment “according to Law”). 
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from enacting any “ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (adverting to state “inspection laws” and “such 
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class.50  Sometimes the text is more precise.  For example, care is taken elsewhere in 
Article II to specify when the “law” concerned is one enacted by Congress.51  Article III 
and the Supremacy Clause also distinguish between “the laws of the United States” and 
“Treaties.”52  If those provisions had referred only to “the laws of the United States,” 
would treaties have been excluded?53  More particularly, does the fact that the Take Care 
Clause refers only to “the Laws” mean that treaties are outside its ambit?  
1. Including treaties.  While a few have signaled doubt,54 the evidence from the 
framing is consistent with the notion that treaties are among “the Laws” assigned to the 
President under the Take Care Clause.  The drafting history is only suggestive.  Madison 
originally wanted to give a “National Executive” the power to execute “the National 
Laws,” a formulation that would have applied awkwardly to international laws,55 as 
might “the Laws of the United States” preferred by the Committee of Detail.56 
Eventually, though, the Committee of Style abbreviated it to “the laws.”57  One may 
                                                                                                                                                 
Laws” as relate to import and export duties); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power “to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity,” of relevant types). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (congressional authority to “define and punish . . . Offences 
against the Law of Nations”).  
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (permitting Congress to “provide for calling forth the Militia to 
execute the Laws of the Union”). 
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, 
Resignation or Inability”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“Congress may by Law” provide for the appointment of 
inferior officers). 
52  Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power to cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority”); id. art. VI, § 2 
(establishing supremacy of “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States”).  The Supremacy Clause further distinguishes “the Laws of any state.”  Id.   
53 For many, it would make no difference, because the categories already seem to overlap.  See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 111(1) (“International law and international agreements of 
the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several States”) (emphasis 
added). 
54 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 203 (1990) (“[T]he Framers 
apparently intended to limit presidential enforcement power to laws resulting from legislative action”).  See 
generally Jinks & Sloss, supra note 21, at 157-60 (describing competing considerations, and weighing 
evidence, in relating Take Care Clause to presidential authority to violate treaties). 
55 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(Madison) (May 29).  This language or its equivalent persisted for a while.  1 RECORDS 63 (Journal) (June 
1); 1 RECORDS 64, 67 (Committee of the Whole); 2 RECORDS 23 (Journal) (July 17); 2 RECORDS 145 
(Committee of Detail); see also 1 RECORDS 244 (New Jersey Plan) (“the federal acts”); 1 RECORDS 292 
(Hamilton Plan) (“all laws passed”). 
56 2 RECORDS 171 (Committee of Detail); see also 2 RECORDS 158 (Pinckney Plan) (“Laws of the 
United States”). 
57  2 RECORDS 574, 600 (Committee of Style). 
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speculate that dispensing with the qualifiers – “National,” and then “of the United States” 
– was intended to admit treaties,58 accomplishing more economically what the laundry 
lists in Article III and the Supremacy Clause did.  
Post-ratification experience, including during the era’s formative foreign affairs 
controversies, speaks more directly to the question.  The principal authors of the 
Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, debated presidential 
authority to issue a proclamation of neutrality as to the conflict between Great Britain and 
France – authority President Washington claimed notwithstanding obligations owed to 
France under a Treaty of Alliance and a Treaty of Amity and Commerce.  Hamilton, 
writing as Pacificus, argued comprehensively in favor of the executive branch’s authority 
to manage foreign affairs.  Madison, as Helvidius, pushed the legislative role in making 
war and entering into treaties.59  While opinions differ about how much the essays 
disagreed and who won,60 they were on the same page with respect to the Take Care 
Clause.  Pacificus stated that “[t]he executive is charged with the execution of all laws, 
the laws of Nations as well as the Municipal law, which recognizes and adopts those 
laws.”61  Helvidius explicitly concurred,62 adding “[t]hat the executive is bound faithfully 
to execute the laws of neutrality, whilst those laws continue unaltered by the competent 
authority, is true . . . It is bound to the faithful execution of these as of all other laws 
internal and external.”63  
                                                 
58 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 602 n.65 
(2002) (making this point). 
59 In an exchange anticipating more modern disputes about “failed states,” Helvidius took 
particular exception to Pacificus’ argument concerning the continued vitality of the Treaty of Alliance in 
the wake of the French Revolution 
60 William R. Casto, Pacificus & Helvidius Reconsidered, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 612, 613 (2001) 
(arguing that the Pacificus and Helvidius essays were “not in significant conflict”); id. at 612 n.3 (citing 
those contending that Pacificus and Helvidius were at loggerheads with one another).  
61 Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, June 29, 1793, 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
33 (Harold R. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1961-1987), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 
65; see also 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 566 (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1851) (reprinting draft 
message of March 29, 1796, by Hamilton for Washington) [hereinafter Hamilton’s March 29, 1796 Draft 
Message] (“Treaties, therefore, in our government, of themselves and without any additional sanction, have 
full legal perfection as laws.”). 
62 After repeating a passage from Pacificus No. 1, including as the first sentence the above-quoted 
passage that “[t]he executive is charged with the execution of all laws, the laws of nations as well as the 
municipal law which recognises and adopts those laws” – Helvidius affirmed that “[t]he first sentence is a 
truth.” James Madison, Helvidius No. II, 6 Writings 138, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 72. 
63 Id. 
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There was also substantial – but not total – agreement on the take care authority 
during subsequent controversies regarding extraditions, beginning with the famous 
Jonathan Robbins affair.  Robbins was arrested in South Carolina based on accusations 
that he had committed murder aboard a British ship.  President Adams, through Secretary 
of State Pickering, communicated his “advice and request” to a federal district court that 
Robbins be extradited to Great Britain pursuant to a provision in the Jay Treaty.64  The 
court found it had jurisdiction over Robbins and ordered him turned over to the British.65   
These actions proved extraordinarily controversial, and President Adams was 
accused of commandeering the federal judiciary – in service of the British, and against a 
(purported) U.S. citizen, to boot.  In the debate over whether Adams should be censured, 
Representative Albert Gallatin criticized Adams’ assumption of implementing authority 
that, in Gallatin’s view, was properly reserved to the House.  But his objections hinged on 
the perception that the treaty was non-self-executing in character – which he surmised 
from gaps in the treaty and from the British practice of requiring parliamentary 
implementation – and he acknowledged that otherwise the President was constitutionally 
enjoined to “take care” that treaties be faithfully executed.66  Then-Representative John 
Marshall had the task of defending President Adams.  Although he also made an 
extensive structural case for executive authority, Marshall’s textual argument stressed the 
Take Care Clause, agreeing with Gallatin that the President is “charged to execute the 
laws” and “[a] treaty is declared to be a law” – and disagreeing only as to whether there 
was such a “total omission” in the treaty as to disable its execution.67 
                                                 
64 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between His Britannic Majesty and the United 
States of America, art. 27, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 129, T.S. 105; see Ruth Wedgwood, The 
Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 246-47, 266-68 (1990) (discussing 
Article 27 and its relation to the Robbins affair); id. at 287-99 (discussing President Adams’ request and the 
subsequent proceedings in federal court). 
65 United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (digesting opinion); 
Wedgwood, supra note 64, at 299-304.  The different rendering of the prisoner’s name in the case caption 
is generally not followed.  
66 See A. Gallatin, Observations on Robbins's Case (n.d.), quoted in Wedgwood, supra note 64, at 
336.  As Professor Wedgwood observes, Gallatin’s extrapolation from the British decision to adopt 
implementing legislation was particularly inapposite to the new U.S. constitutional order. 
67 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-614 (1800) (Rep. Marshall). 
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Neither side in the Jonathan Robbins affair cemented its understanding of the 
Constitution: Marshall prevailed with respect to censure,68 but President Adams lost the 
political war, the United States lost its passion for forging extradition treaties, and the 
executive branch lost its zeal for unilaterally enforcing existing treaties.69  Still, there was 
little if any controversy regarding the shared assumption that treaties fall within the Take 
Care Clause.  Presidents subsequently invoked the Take Care Clause to justify acts 
carrying out treaty obligations,70 and the executive branch seems never to have 
questioned that view.71  Supreme Court cases, principally in dicta, have taken a broad 
view of “the Laws” encompassed within the Take Care Clause, and on numerous 
occasions have specifically included treaties among them72 – indeed, without stopping 
there.  The apex was In re Neagle, in which the Court – seeking to justify freeing from 
                                                 
68 Not to mention libel.  See United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 641-42 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) 
(Chase, J., riding circuit) (instructing a jury that, in essence, Marshall’s view of presidential authority was 
correct as a matter of law). 
69 In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852); see Wedgwood, supra note 64, at 361.  
70 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 50-51 (2nd ed. 1996) 
(“Presidents invoked that authority to carry out U.S. obligations to send troops to various parts of Latin 
America when required by treaty; to extradite persons to a foreign country; to suppress piracy and slave 
trade; to restore to a foreign government its vessels or other property; to compel U.S. citizens to honor the 
obligations of neutrality; to intern foreign insurgents when the United States was obligated to do so under 
an international convention”); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 78, 85-
88 (1925) (stressing that Take Care Clause is “not confined to acts of Congress,” and citing example of 
Platt Amendment to U.S.-Cuba treaty); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 217, 227 (1922); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH 
MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1916) (citing examples suggesting that “executive measures 
appropriate to the fulfillment of treaty obligations may be effectively used under no authority other than the 
treaty itself”). 
71 To the contrary, see, e.g., The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 571 (1841) (argument of Attorney 
General) (“The executive government was bound to take the proper steps for having the treaty executed .... 
A treaty is the supreme law; the executive duty is especially to take care that the laws be faithfully executed 
....”); Constitutionality of Legislative Provision Regarding ABM Treaty, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 246 
(1996) (“It belongs exclusively to the President to interpret and execute treaties.  This is a direct corollary 
of his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care’ that the laws are faithfully executed.”); accord Relevance 
of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, 11 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 28 (1987); 
Constitutionality of Proposed Conditions to Senate Consent to the Interim Convention on Conservation of 
North Pacific Fur Seals, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 12 (1986); Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces 
Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1980); 10 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 
74 (1861). 
72 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in 
judgment) (adverting to the President’s “duty to execute [treaties’] provisions”); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 668-69 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting) (describing “legal obligations,” 
and more, arising from treaties and requiring presidential enforcement); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (declaring 
that “[t]he power to exclude or expel aliens ... is to be regulated by treaty or by act of congress, and to be 
executed by the executive authority,” regardless of whether the rules are derived from treaties or statutes). 
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state custody a U.S. marshal charged with murder for acts taken while defending Justice 
Field – asked rhetorically whether take care authority is “limited to the enforcement of 
acts of congress or of treaties of the United States according to their express terms; or 
does it include the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the constitution itself, 
our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government 
under the constitution?”73  Justice Lamar’s vigorous dissent disputed the majority’s 
constitutional theory and its application in the domestic context, but he conceded that the 
treaty-making authority conferred a substantially greater power of execution on the 
executive branch.74  If In re Neagle is more than sport,75 it stands for the proposition that 
treaties, their penumbras, and the treaty-making power itself act as bases for the exercise 
of take care authority. 
2. The anti-plenary principle.  A far more cautionary note was later struck in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,76 probably the low-water mark for presidential 
authority.   The Court was most focused on the extent of that authority, rather than its 
legal foundation, but its discussion is also relevant to the threshold question of “the 
Laws” included within the Take Care Clause.  In criticizing the President’s attempt to 
derive executive power to seize the steel mills from the Take Care Clause, the Court 
observed that “[t]he President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress – it directs that a presidential policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by the President.”77 
                                                 
73 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).  In re Neagle invoked the Take Care Clause by analogy, being instead 
concerned primarily with the used of the word “law” in the federal habeas corpus statute, and the Court also 
discovered more specific statutory authorization for U.S. marshals and their deputies.  Id. at 68, 74-75. 
74 The majority, describing the Koszta episode – in which U.S. personnel had forcibly demanded 
release of a would-be U.S. citizen abducted by Austria while in Turkey – asked point-blank, “Upon what 
act of congress then existing can any one lay his finger in support of the action of our government in this 
matter?”  id. at 64.  Justice Lamar’s answer, for himself and Chief Justice Fuller: “[S]uch action of the 
government was justified because it pertained to the foreign relations of the United States . . . In reply, 
therefore, to the question, what law expressly justifies such action? We answer, the organic law, the 
constitution, which expressly commits all matters pertaining to our diplomatic negotiations to the treaty-
making power.”  Id. at 84-86 (Lamar, J., dissenting).  For original correspondence and commentary, see 
The Koszta Case (1853), in 3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 820, 820-54 (1906). 
75 See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 505 (1915) (quoting In re Neagle); 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 88 (1990) (noting that In re Neagle has 
been invoked to justify substantial exercises of presidential power). 
76 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
77 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (emphasis added). 
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This contrast may be understood in several ways, with quite different 
implications.  Conceivably, the Court meant that the President was charged only with 
executing statutes, excluding treaties (and the Constitution) from the Take Care Clause.78  
Alternatively, it may have meant to exclude presidential policy that did not purport to 
enforce some other law; this would authorize implementing treaties, presumably, but 
would also tend to confine Youngstown to its facts.79  On a third reading, what 
Youngstown opposes is premising take care authority on some other presidential 
initiative.  This would exclude, accordingly, not only presidential policy lacking any 
other basis in law (as found to be the case in Youngstown), but anything dependent on 
presidential initiative, such as the Commander-in-Chief authority claimed, 
unsuccessfully, in Youngstown.80 The implications for treaties are unclear.  If 
bootstrapping were feared only when the President creates authority by himself, treaties 
pass muster;81 but if it is also to be avoided when the President controls, in the final 
instance, whether to create take care authority, they would not.82   
                                                 
78  This is suggested by the Court’s immediately preceding reference to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, with the remark that “the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws 
which the President is to execute.”  Id. at 588; see also id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“T]he power to 
execute the laws starts and ends with the laws Congress has enacted.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52, 177 (“The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the 
laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave in his power.”). 
79 Some other theory, presumably, would be required to exclude presidential enforcement of state 
law.  State statutes are indeed “Laws” in any technical sense – but not, significantly, laws of the kind 
otherwise entrusted to the President’s care.  There seems to be little support for the notion that they are 
among the laws encompassed within the Take Care Clause.  Insurrection in a State, 8 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 
8, July 19, 1856 (the Take Care Clause “refers primarily to the laws of the United States, and to those of a 
State or Territory only in the contingency when the case of insurrection therein is presented according to 
the Constitution and to acts of Congress”); HENKIN, supra note 70, at  348 n.57 (“The President has no 
constitutional authority to execute the laws of the States or of any foreign government”); ALBERT H. 
PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 300 (1908) (under the Take Care Clause, 
“[t]he laws which [the President] must see executed are those of the United States, not those of the States”).  
But see infra text accompanying note 226 (discussing possibility of taking secondary account of state laws). 
80 This would exclude most Article II authority from “the Laws,” though it is unclear how much 
take care authority adds to the President’s exercise of other Article II powers.  Other constitutional 
authority might remain to be executed.  For example, the President might still invoke the Take Care Clause 
as a basis for enforcing constitutional restrictions on the power of the states. 
81  Senate consent, of course, is necessary.  Any international agreement also requires a foreign 
partner, which limits the potential for self-aggrandizement; the acid test of that consideration, presumably, 
would be executive agreements. 
82 Treaties not only require presidential negotiation, but also ratification.  (Statutes, in contrast, can 
be enacted without presidential assent, if the votes exist to override a veto.)  Moreover, the modern treaty-
making process is dominated by the executive branch.  JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS OF 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 217 (1925) (noting, in distinguishing the presidential role in treaty-
making from legislation, that in the former “[a]t every stage his is the active will”); id. at 218 (adding that 
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The fourth, most persuasive reading suggests that “Laws” should be interpreted so 
as to mitigate presidential discretion – avoiding an absence of checks on the policy’s 
“execut[ion] in a manner prescribed by the President.”83  This would challenge a 
President’s invocation of a constitutional provision not invariably, as would the anti-
bootstrapping view, but only if the provision’s open-textured nature meant that executive 
choices were unconstrained.84   
Applying this anti-plenary view to non-constitutional provisions entails two 
threshold questions that figured prominently in the early debates.  The first concerns 
whether the law the President seeks to enforce is binding upon him.  Resisting Gallatin’s 
argument in the Jonathan Robbins affair that there was a gap or a defect in the law that 
President Adams was trying to fill,85 Marshall not only denied that there was any such 
“total Legislative omission,” but emphasized that “[t]he treaty, stipulating that a murderer 
shall be delivered up to justice, is as obligatory as an act of Congress making the same 
declaration.  If . . . there was an act of Congress in the words of the treaty, . . . could the 
President, who is bound to execute the laws, have justified the refusal to deliver up the 
criminal, by saying, that the Legislature had totally omitted to provide for the case?”86   
Marshall’s views reflected the categorical opinion of his contemporaries that treaties 
were binding upon everyone, including the President.87  If not, the argument ran, who 
would trust us?88 
                                                                                                                                                 
treaties are “not ordinances of the President acting alone”).  Cf. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 49 (2004) (arguing that 
“the ‘executive Power,’ in the course of carrying out its fundamental function, can execute only laws that 
already exist independently of the exercise of federal executive power.’”). 
83 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (emphasis added). 
84 Thus permitting, for example, the combination of the Commander-in-Chief Clause and Take 
Care Clause thought to license the seizure of American vessels without statutory authorization in Little v. 
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804), but looking more skeptically on a presidential obligation to 
protect the “nature of government.”  In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). 
85 See supra text accompanying note 66. 
86 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800). 
87 Consider, for example, the sweeping advice proffered by Chief Justice Ellsworth: “The instant 
the President and Senate have made a Treaty, the Constitution makes it a law of the land; and of course, all 
persons and bodies in whatever station or department within the jurisdiction of the United States are bound 
to conform their actions and proceedings to it.”  William R. Casto, Two Advisory Opinions by Chief Justice 
Oliver Ellsworth, 6 GREEN BAG 413 (2003) (reprinting letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, 
March 13, 1796); see Hamilton’s March 29, 1796 Draft Message, supra note 61, at 567 (“[W]hen a treaty 
contains nothing but what the Constitution permits, it is conclusive upon all, and all are bound to give it 
effect.”).  The idea that the President would be bound was not considered particularly radical, given the 
conviction of some that the Congress was legally bound by treaties.  Id. at 567 (“Can that doctrine be true 
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The second question is whether presidential authority that would otherwise arise 
under the Take Care Clause has been displaced by the law in question, or by other laws – 
ordinarily, in the treaty context, through a commitment made by the original treaty-
makers or in statute adopted subsequently by Congress.89  As Professors Goldsmith and 
Manning put it in the statutory context, the President’s executive authority is a defeasible 
one.90  In his speech in the Jonathan Robbins affair, Marshall famously declaimed that 
“Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on 
others the whole execution of the contract; but till this be done, it seems the duty of the 
Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.”91  This sense of 
a default authority pervades the early cases.  In Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice Marshall 
appeared favorably inclined toward an assertion of take care authority, based solely on 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, to seize American vessels engaged in commerce 
inconsistent with the hostilities then prevailing between the United States and France.92  
But the fact remained that Congress had also provided “special authority” and in so doing 
“prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be carried into execution, was to 
exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French port”93 – in effect, displacing 
presidential assertions of an inconsistent take care authority based on the Constitution. 
3. Including non-self-executing treaties.  Fully applying the anti-plenary 
approach to treaties requires distinguishing among them, including among non-self-
executing treaties – a label everyone uses differently, with varying perceived 
                                                                                                                                                 
which may present a treaty operating as a law upon all the citizens of a country, and yet legally disregarded 
by a portion of the legislative body?”). 
88 See, e.g., Letter III of Marcus (Mar. 5, 1788), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 324-25 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (citing opinion of 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jay, and adding that “[i]t seems to result unavoidably from the nature of the 
thing, that when the constitutional right to make treaties is exercised, the treaty so made should be binding 
upon those who delegated authority for that purpose.  If it was not, what foreign power would trust us?”). 
89 “Treaty-makers” is meant to refer both to those on the international plane – the states 
negotiating the treaty – and, on the domestic front, the Senate in imparting consent and the President in 
ratifying the treaty.  This broad view of authority creates the most stringent conditions for the exercise of 
presidential authority. 
90 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 20, at 2282. 
91 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800). 
92 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804). 
93 Id. at 177-78. 
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consequences.94  If a treaty provision is self-executing, no legislation is necessary before 
it acquires domestic force of law;95 labeling a provision as non-self-executing is usually 
(not always) intended to suggest that legislation is necessary.96  Sometimes non-self-
execution is prescriptive in origin: an agreement indicates that further domestic 
implementation is necessary, or the Senate in consenting (or Congress by resolution) 
requires it.97  Alternatively, the Constitution may require implementing legislation, as 
when a treaty provision requires the appropriation of money, criminalizes conduct or 
requires imposing criminal punishment, or amounts to a declaration of war.98  In either 
case, the fact that non-self-executing treaties await further lawmaking suggests to some 
                                                 
94 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 
(1995) (describing four different doctrines of non-self-execution); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing 
Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (describing four different 
assumptions regarding non-self-execution).  Commentaries often describe treaties as self-executing or non-
self-executing in the aggregate, but the answer may vary by provision. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 
12, § 111 cmt. h. 
95 See, e.g., TWA v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (stating, in describing the Warsaw 
Convention as self-executing, that “no domestic legislation is required to give the Convention the force of 
law in the United States”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (concluding that “in a strict 
sense” a tariff treaty between the United States and Great Britain “was self-executing, in that no legislation 
was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions”); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 
190, 194 (1888) (defining “self-executing” as meaning that treaty provisions “require no legislation to 
make them operative”). 
96 Sometimes, “non-self-executing” is meant more literally, to connote that a treaty requires 
implementation by some means – legislative or otherwise.  The potential role for presidential take authority 
is then obvious.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 111 cmt. h (“[T]he intention of the United States 
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States or should await 
implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or administrative action.”) (emphasis added); 
Memorandum by Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser, for the Tripartite Advisory Panel on 
International Labor Standards, Nov. 25, 1980, reprinted in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1980 at 394, 395 (Marian Nash Leich ed., 1988) (explaining that a non-self-executing 
treaty provision “cannot be applied directly by our courts as if it were a statute or other rule of law”; 
“[r]ather, implementation or ‘execution’ of some kind is required, usually in the form of implementing 
legislation”); e.g., United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Machinery Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1st Cir. 
1907) (treaties, like statutes, “may be so framed as to make it apparent that it does not become practically 
effective until something further is done, either by Congress itself or by some officer or commission 
intrusted with certain powers with reference thereto”); Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 
702-03 (1878) (noting that proscriptive treaties do “not need to be supplemented by legislative or executive 
action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline to override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed 
restrictions”), cited with approval, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886);  
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 111(4)(a), (b); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000). 
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 111(4)(c), cmt. I & rptrs. note 6; Congressional 
Research Service, 106th Cong., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States 
Senate, S. Prt. No. 106-71, at 73 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS]; e.g., The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 
838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925) (“It is not the function of treaties to enact the fiscal or criminal law of a nation.  
For this purpose no treaty is self-executing.”). 
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that they are categorically excluded from the “Laws” contemplated by the Take Care 
Clause.99 
A more granular understanding of non-self-execution suggests that conclusion is 
overbroad.  Treaties are usually described as non-self-executing to connote that they 
require legislation before individuals may invoke them in courts; otherwise, the 
Supremacy Clause means that they are judicially enforceable at those individuals’ 
behest.100  This speaks inexactly to the question posed by the Take Care Clause.  Perhaps 
a non-self-executing provision is not “Law of the Land” for all Supremacy Clause 
purposes, but remains among “the Laws” for the Take Care Clause; to say that a treaty is 
not yet ripe for an individual to enforce in court does not necessarily mean it requires 
legislation before the President must heed it.  Treating the questions as coterminous has 
appeal, but supposes a coherent commitment to non-self-execution in the Founding Era 
that exceeds the evidence.101  Moreover, the oft-repeated rationalization for non-self-
                                                 
99 See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1230, 1239 (2007); Van Alstine, supra note 4, at 333-34.  But see JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (2nd ed. 2003) (“[U]nless a matter lies directly within the exclusive 
prerogative of Congress, it is otherwise constitutionally precluded, or legislation is required by the 
international instrument, the President must faithfully execute an otherwise non-self-executing treaty.”).  
Cf. Curtis J. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 S. CT. REV. 59, 
95 (asserting in passing that “the President's Take Care authority may include some ability to give legal 
effect to a non-self-executing treaty obligation”); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1213, 1232-33 (2005) (describing “[t]he relationship between the Take Care Clause and non-self-
executing treaties [a]s complex and disputed”). 
Most commentaries address take care authority for treaties at a more general level, leaving one to 
piece together their opinion on non-self-execution.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 111 
(providing that international agreements are “law of the United States” such that “the President has the 
obligation and the necessary authority to take care that they be faithfully executed.”).  Professor Henkin’s 
treatise may be inconsistent.  Compare HENKIN, supra note 70, at 206-07 (“Self-executing treaties, and 
other treaties after they are implemented by Congress, are subject to the President’s duty to ‘take care’”), 
with id. at 203-04 (all treaties, self-executing or not, legally bind the United States and constitute the 
supreme law of the land), and id. at 204 (suggesting that even for non-self-executing treaties, “[i]t is [the] 
obligation [of the President and Senate] to see to it that it is faithfully implemented; it is their obligation to 
do what is necessary to make it a rule for the courts” if that is proper).  Perhaps the President’s obligation is 
limited to the legislative process – introducing legislation, or not vetoing it – but it is simply not clear.  Cf. 
id. at 206-07 (“If a treaty entails domestic regulation and legal consequences in the United States, and is not 
self-executing, or if it requires appropriation of funds, the President has to seek Congressional action.”).   
100 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 
190, 194 (1888); Vazquez, supra note 94, at 695-96 & n.7.  As Professor Vázquez notes, other doctrines 
like standing may also impair direct enforcement.  Id. at 699 n.20. 
101 To the contrary, many expressed an unqualified view that treaties were binding under the U.S. 
Constitution, including (seemingly) for the President, irrespective of whether those treaties might be 
enforced by individuals in court.  See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.   This may have amounted to a 
conviction that all treaties were self-executing.  E.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical 
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
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executing treaties, they are not cognizable in the courts because they are first addressed to 
the political branches,102 may be perfectly consistent with vesting authority in the 
President.   
It is more constructive, accordingly, to draw a different distinction among treaty 
provisions, one disaggregating the effects of non-self-execution.  One class of treaty 
provisions might be called non-executive: prescriptively non-self-executing (or self-
executing) treaty provisions that necessarily inhibit executive branch authority,103 
constitutionally non-self-executing provisions (all of which preserve congressional 
primacy),104 and any provisions that provide constitutionally inadequate direction to the 
President.105  The residual, broader class of executive provisions comprises all other self-
executing and non-self-executing provisions.106   
                                                                                                                                                 
2095, 2128-29 (1999) (citing near-universal evidence of opinion during Convention and during ratification 
debates); C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REV. 709, 
748 (1958) (“[I]t seems unlikely that the framers intended legislative actions should ever be required to 
give effect to treaties in domestic law”); cf. Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1479 (2006) (describing regime of partial self-execution).  This suggests that it may be 
anachronistic to construe the Take Care Clause through the non-self-execution doctrine of Foster v. 
Nielsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).  
102  See, e.g., The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“A treaty is primarily a compact 
between independent nations” that depends on governmental honor and good will and, if that fails, on 
“international negotiations and reclamations”; “[i]t is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have 
nothing to do and can give no redress.”); Foster v. Nielsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“[W]hen the 
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the 
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the 
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (explaining that for “the particular Security Council Resolution on which plaintiffs rely,” the 
provisions relied on “were not addressed to the judicial branch of our government”). 
103 This may be evidenced by general non-self-execution provisions – affecting all actors, 
including potentially the President – in the treaty itself, in a reservation, understanding, or declaration 
(RUD) to the treaty, or in subsequent legislation.  See infra text accompanying notes 108, 113 (providing 
examples).  The President’s power would also be limited by provisions delegating enforcement 
responsibility elsewhere, such as those entrusting an enforcement decision to the prevailing state.  
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration), 
Jan. 19, 1981, ¶ 17, U.S.-Iran, 81 DEP’T ST. BULL., Feb. 1981, at 1, reprinted in 1 IRAN- U.S. C.T.R. 3 
(1983) (providing that “[a]ny decision of the [Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal] . . . may be enforced by the 
prevailing party in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.”).  The more controversial 
examples involve international institutions – for example, the inspections regime associated with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, January 13, 1993, art. IX & Verification Annex, Part II, 32 
I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter CWC]; see John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998) 
(elaborating constitutional objection to inspection regime). 
104 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
105 See McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 748 (describing as non-self-executing “treaties [that] 
impose obligations intended to be discharged through legislative action or fail to provide guides for 
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To be sure, this distinction is not itself self-executing, any more than the 
conventional inquiry into non-self-execution.  Courts that have difficulty identifying 
whether a treaty requires further implementation may have equal difficulty deciding 
whether that implementation must take the particular form of legislation.  Just as it may 
be unclear whether U.S. treaty-makers opposed all invocations of a treaty by individuals, 
or (only) private rights of action,107 it may be unclear whether they sought further to 
prevent executive implementation in the absence of legislation.108   
Whatever its difficulties, the executive/non-executive distinction is both truer to 
the anti-plenary understanding of Youngstown and permits more nuanced directions from 
the treaty-makers.  The first inquiry, again, is whether treaties, or the subclass of treaty 
provisions in question, bind the President.  If they do, then the Take Care Clause is 
implicated; if they do not, then they would not constrain his attempts to execute them, 
and licensing the President to implement them under the Take Care Clause would confer 
excessive authority.109  The executive branch has generally contended that non-self–
                                                                                                                                                 
executive action”).  This would therefore include provisions that violate the anti-plenary principle 
developed in the remainder of this section. 
106 The extent of permissible execution, of course, is another matter, and there may be independent 
constitutional limitations, like the anti-commandeering doctrine, that prohibit execution by the national 
government altogether.  See infra text accompanying notes 162-165. 
107 Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 97, at 421 (arguably that all invocations by 
individuals were targeted), with David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999) (suggesting that only 
individual causes of action were). 
108 This distinction is of potential significance for human rights treaties employing non-self-
executing declarations, but lacking the kind of proviso used for the Genocide Convention and the Torture 
Convention.  The State Department’s concern – that “the substantive provisions of the treaties would not of 
themselves become effective as domestic law”, see Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. Exec. Doc. No. 95-2, at v, vi (letter of submittal, 
U.S. Dept. of State, Dec. 17, 1977) – was consistent with presidential execution; the interest was mainly in 
warding off any suggestion that they were “directly enforceable law on a par with Congressional statutes.”  
Id. at viii, xv; see id. at viii (indicating that “it is . . . preferable to leave any further implementation that 
may be desired to the domestic legislative and judicial process”) (emphasis added).  Presidential execution 
would also be consistent with some of the stated rationales for non-self-execution.  Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 97, at 419-20.  It would not, certainly, satisfy any desire to involve the House of Representative 
in determining the scope of domestic rights.  On the other hand, the President could serve the goal of 
reconciling any minor differences between treaty-based rights and domestic law, particularly if U.S. law 
already satisfied virtually all treaty obligations.   
109 It appears that the President retains, as a practical matter, the capacity to end the obligation 
completely – for either self-executing or non-self-executing treaties – but that simultaneously terminates 
any pretense to take care authority.  See supra text accompanying note 26 (noting withdrawal of United 
States from Optional Protocol); cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (declining to decide whether 
the President has unilateral authority to terminate treaties).  
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executing provisions confer authority just as would their self-executing kin.110  However, 
it has at least once contended that the President may lawfully violate non-self-executing 
treaties;111 if that position were maintained, contrary to the weight of authority, it would 
surely undermine any claim to take care authority, if not eliminate it.    
The second anti-plenary inquiry – whether the President’s take care authority has 
been limited by the Constitution or by the treaty-makers – dovetails with the shift from 
speaking in terms of non-self-execution to distinguishing between executive and non-
executive provisions.  Provisions that constitutionally require implementation by 
Congress, and that even the Senate and President together could not manage, clearly limit 
the President’s authority standing alone.  Likewise, if state parties expected that 
legislation would be required prior to any and all domestic implementation112 – or if the 
treaty-makers established that understanding on the domestic plane113 – the President 
                                                 
110  For example, William Howard Taft – while rebutting more expansive theories of presidential 
authority, and insisting on locating presidential authority in some “affirmative constitutional or statutory 
provision” – described the Take Care Clause as encompassing treaties not yet implemented by domestic 
legislation, and not as being “confined to express Congressional statutes and provisions having force of law 
in treaties.”  TAFT, supra note 70, at 139-40, 85-92; accord Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces 
Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185, 186 (1980) (citing foreign affairs 
powers in support of presidential authority to deploy armed forces abroad, and stating that “[t]he President 
also derives authority from [the Take Care Clause], for both treaties and customary international law are 
part of our law and Presidents have repeatedly asserted authority to enforce our international obligations 
even when Congress has not enacted implementing legislation”). 
111 Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override International Law in 
Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 163 (1989) (concluding that 
“the President, acting through the Attorney General, has inherent constitutional authority to order the FBI 
to investigate and arrest individuals in a manner that departs from international law,” including 
“unexecuted treaties or treaty provisions that have not become part of the domestic law of the United 
States.”); id. (describing compliance with “an unexecuted treaty [a]s a political issue rather than a legal 
one,” because it is “not legally binding on the political branches,” so that the President “retains full 
authority to determine whether to pursue action abridging the provisions of unexecuted treaties”).   
112 As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith observe, it has sometimes happened – not, to my 
knowledge, since World War II – that “international non-self-execution clauses” made treaties (or parts 
thereof) effective only after Congress passed implementing legislation.  Bradley &. Goldsmith, supra note 
97, at 408; e.g., Convention between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the 
Hawaiian Islands, Jan. 30, 1875, U.S.-Hawaii, art. V, 19 Stat. 625, 627 (postponing treaty’s effectiveness 
“until a law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of 
America”).  And a few treaties, again none of recent vintage, have specified that implementation would be 
accomplished by Congress.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 97, at 408; e.g., Treaty of Peace Between the 
United States and Austria, Aug. 24, 1921, U.S.-Aus., 42 Stat. 1946, 1949 (providing that U.S. would refrain 
from involvement with international treaty body “unless and until an Act of the Congress of the United 
States shall provide for such representation or participation.”). 
113 For example, for both the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention, the Senate 
resolutions of ratification instructed the President not to deposit the U.S. instrument of ratification until 
Congress had enacted implementing legislation.  U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to 
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could not assume authority that had been diverted.  Last, but scarcely least, the 
President’s authority remains fully defeasible in other regards.  Assuming, for example, 
that a non-self-execution declaration conditioning U.S. consent to a human rights treaty 
did not directly oust presidential authority, such authority would remain subject to 
substantive conditions on U.S. consent and relevant statutory enactments.114 
B. How Are Treaties to “be faithfully executed”? 
Assume we know what “the Laws” are.  What does it mean to “take Care” that 
they “be faithfully executed”?  The initial question is whether the Take Care Clause 
confers authority of some kind, or rather only reminds us that the President is subject to 
the law.  If authority is entailed, the question of limiting principles becomes paramount. 
1. The case for affirmative authority.  Probably the majority view among 
commentators is that de minimis authority, at most, is conferred by the Take Care Clause.  
The precise formulation varies.  A minimalist conception has the Clause cautioning the 
President to refrain from acting contrary to law, and probably enables responsibility for 
ensuring compliance by the executive branch as a whole.115  A broader and more popular 
variant obliges the President to pursue compliance, according to the letter of law, both 
within and without the executive branch, with the objective of the Take Care Clause 
being to negative the executive’s assumption of any “dispensing power” to ignore the law 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 Cong. 
Rec. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (declaration); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to 
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (proviso).  This meant that there was no 
internationally binding treaty, non-self-executing or otherwise, available for implementation until after 
legislation was enacted. 
114 For example, legislation implementing the Genocide Convention – which had lacked any non-
self-execution declaration – added an extremely broad provision attempting the same thing.  18 U.S.C. § 
1092 (providing, in implementing Genocide Convention, that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed 
as . . .creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceeding”). 
115 The distinction may be significant for attempts to invoke the Take Care Clause against 
congressional encroachments into the administration of law.  See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
117, 132 (1926) (citing Take Care Clause in support of removal power); Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain 
Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979).  But it may not materially alter 
the conception of the clause as imposing duties only.  See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands 
a Thing to be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to 
Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 275 (2003)  (“[I]t is true that the president, to do his job, is 
impliedly granted those powers which enable him to see that the laws are, in fact, faithfully executed, and 
he is impliedly given sufficient power to supervise subordinates to see that they are performing their tasks.  
But, in its essence, this clause is a duty conferred”).  
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selectively.116  These approaches share the notion that the clause is a duty rather than a 
power – meaning that, in practice, only the executive branch is subject to it.117   
This is a powerful and appealing reading – the dominant theme of the Take Care 
Clause, certainly, is one of restraint and mindfulness – but ultimately incomplete.  The 
text, often taken to belie any grant of power,118 actually cuts in both directions: to “take 
Care” of the laws is more capacious than mere obedience; the passive phrasing of the 
President’s responsibility, “that the laws be faithfully executed,” does not intimate an 
exclusive focus on self-compliance; and it is odd, to the modern ear, to treat “execute” as 
synonymous with “comply” (one does not “execute” a speed limit by obeying it).119  The 
drafting history, insofar as it evolved away from references to a “power,” favors a narrow 
reading.120  But those changes were not explained, and the shift toward obligatory 
language does not, by itself, contraindicate the notion that power was simultaneously 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 82, at 47 (describing the Take Care Clause’s 
function “as an anti-inference provision by foreclosing any argument . . . that the ‘executive Power’ 
includes a general power to suspend the laws”); Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of 
'Unconstitutional' Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 873-74 (1994) 
(same). 
117 See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
149 (1829) (the Take Care Clause “declares what is [the President’s] duty, and gives him no power beyond 
it.  The Constitution, treaties, and acts of congress, are declared to be the supreme law of the land.  He is 
bound to enforce them; if he attempts to carry his power further, he violates the Constitution.”); JOSEPH 
STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 177-78 (1840) (“[W]e are 
not to understand, that this clause confers on the President any new and substantial power to cause the laws 
to be faithfully executed, by any means, which he shall see fit to adopt, although not prescribed by the 
Constitution, or by the acts of Congress.  . . . The true interpretation of the clause is, that the President is to 
use all such means as the Constitution and laws have placed at his disposal, to enforce the due execution of 
the laws”); 2 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1151 
(1910) (the Take Care Clause “is an obligation but confers in itself no powers,” such that “this obligation is 
to be fulfilled by the exercise of those powers which the Constitution and Congress have seen fit to 
confer”). 
118 See, e.g., Cheh, supra note 115, at 275 (“The language and structure of Article II plainly 
indicate that this clause is a duty imposed on the president, not a source of power per se.”); Van Alstine, 
supra note 4, at 334-35 (“[T]he Take Care Clause is essentially a duty, not a power . . . Its operative verb 
thus states that the president ‘shall’ faithfully execute the laws.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, 
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1198 n.221 
(1992) (describing Take Care Clause text as “suggest[ing] an obligation of watchfulness, not a grant of 
power”). 
119 I owe the illustration to John Harrison, though he does not draw the same conclusions from it. 
120 The language changed from the “power to carry into execution,” see 1 RECORDS 63 (Journal) 
(June 1), the “power to carry into effect” national laws, 1 RECORDS 66 (Madison) (June 1); 2 RECORDS 23 
(Journal) (July 17), and the “power[] . . . to carry into execution” with a “duty to provide for the due & 
faithful exec—of the Laws of the United States (be faithfully executed) to the best of his ability,” 2 
RECORDS 145 (Committee of Detail), before moving in the Committee of Style from a duty to “take care 
that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed” to the present form.  2 RECORDS 574, 
600 (Committee of Style). 
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conferred.121  Notably, the Framers eschewed the approach of state provisions that 
expressly prohibited any dispensing or suspensory power without stating any authority 
affirmatively.122   
There is little genuine appetite for any crabbed construction.  In the academy, 
those favoring a narrow understanding of the Take Care Clause not infrequently 
compensate by reading the Vesting Clause quite broadly.123  Others argue that the 
original understanding of the clause, if more confined, must have evolved to keep pace 
with the modern administrative state.124  This reluctance seems to hold for the treaty 
context.  It is widely accepted, for example, that the Take Care Clause authorizes entering 
into executive agreements in furtherance of treaties.125  Academic opinion, accordingly, 
has shown more than token resistance to the de minimis reading of the clause.126 
Case law and practice, in any event, have consistently seen the President’s 
authority differently.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the President’s 
own compliance does not exhaust the Take Care Clause’s import.127  It has also inferred 
authority beyond that specifically conferred by statute or treaty.  The Court has opined, 
for example, that the United States had standing to bring suit, despite the absence of 
                                                 
121 As noted below, it might be sufficiently explained as making clear that the laws equally (but 
not exclusively) bound the President himself. 
122 See 4 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 123-24 (reprinting Virginia Bill of Rights, Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules, and Vermont Constitution). 
123 E.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 118; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The 
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). 
124 E.g., JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 64 (2005). 
125 See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or President 
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 248 280-81 (1945); 31 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 92 (1937) (remarks of Albert Lévitt).  This category may, or may not, overlap 
perfectly with circumstances in which a treaty expressly authorizes follow-on executive agreements.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 12, § 303(3); e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). 
126 E.g., 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 256-57 
(1902) (“When . . . there is a treaty between the United States and a foreign government, the Executive has 
the power to surrender a fugitive to a foreign government, although Congress has not passed any legislation 
to make the treaty effectual”); id. at 258 (noting that certain treaty provisions involved “were self-
operating”); HART, supra note 82, at 235 (“The general principle that the President cannot legislate is 
modified to the extent that he can issue administrative ordinances, not to be sure to create substantial duties 
of officers, but nevertheless to fill up the interstices of the their regular statutory duties”). 
127 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (adverting to “[a] suit which is commenced 
and prosecuted against a State in the name of the United States by those who are entrusted with the 
constitutional duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 922 (1997) (contemplating that the President’s take care authority properly entrusts the executive 
branch with the responsibility for implementing the Brady Act). 
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statutory authorization, in order to “to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign power.”128  
The right to participate in litigation can have significant consequences,129 and sometimes 
take care authority has been reckoned to go considerably farther.  In re Neagle proposed a 
presidential power, exercised through the Attorney General, entitling federal officials to 
habeas corpus relief; United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal subsequently suggested that the 
Take Care Clause permits not only the prosecution of persons violating U.S. federal 
criminal statutes, but also their apprehension.130   
The executive branch, for its part, has relied on the Take Care Clause in the legal 
defense of a variety of constitutional entitlements.131  More conspicuously, presidents 
have relied on take care authority to send troops required under a treaty, to extradite 
persons to a foreign country, to attack the slave trade, to require private citizens to 
observe a state of neutrality, and to intern foreign insurgents when obliged to do so by 
treaty.132  President Cleveland articulated a widely held view in describing the Take Care 
Clause as “equivalent to a grant of all power necessary to the performance of his duty in 
the faithful execution of the laws,” and “evidently intended as a general devolution of 
                                                 
128 Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925).  As the Court 
acknowledged, however, the primary ground for standing was presidential authority to remove an 
obstruction to interstate and foreign commerce.  Id. 
129 For example, in In re The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 108 U.S. 92 (1882), the United States 
appeared in a libel action for the apparent purpose of determining the damages it owed for the capture of a 
Spanish-flagged private vessel.  The Court held that this submission waived its immunity from suit, 
notwithstanding the U.S. objection that the executive branch could not do so in the absence of “express 
legislative authority”; the Court replied that executive’s right derived from its duty under the law of nations 
to submit captured vessels to prize courts for adjudication, given that otherwise the United States would 
violate its obligations to Spain.  Id. at 102-103.    
130 458 U.S. 858, 863 (1982); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
684 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (observing that, in the Jonathan Robbins affair, President Adams 
issued an extradition warrant in furtherance of a treaty without other express authority). 
131 See, e.g., 13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 300, Sept. 28, 1989 (legislation that impairs the 
President’s ability to communicate with Congress and with the American people interferes with take care 
authority); Authority of the President to Remove the Staff Director of the Civil Rights Commission and 
Appoint an Acting Staff Director, 2001 WL 34815748 (OLC), March 30, 2001 (attributing appointment 
power to Take Care Clause); Holdover and Removal of Members of Amtrak’s Reform Board, 2003 WL 
24170382 (OLC), Sept. 22, 2003 (attributing removal power to Take Care Clause and the executive 
power); Maintaining Essential Services in the District of Columbia in the Event Appropriations Cease, 12 
U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 290 (1988) (describing as a “necessary adjunct” of take care authority “the 
power ‘to protect federal property and functions.’”). 
132 For examples, see HART, supra note 82, at 225-38 (1925); HENKIN, supra note 70, at 51; 
WRIGHT, CONTROL , supra note 70, at 217-18; William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the 
Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 613-14 (1916);  
see, e.g., Ex parte Toscano, supra (internment); Presidential Power to Use Armed Forces Abroad Without 
Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185, 186 (1980); Suspension of the Privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 82 (1861). 
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power and imposition of obligation in respect to any condition that might arise relating to 
the execution of the laws.”133   
Nevertheless, further scrutiny is warranted by what’s at stake.  Assuming the Take 
Care Clause licenses initiating legal proceedings, and a host of presidential activities 
outside the judicial sphere, could In re Neagle possibly be right in suggesting that it also 
allows the President to generate binding rules of decision?134  If the Take Care Clause 
allowed the President to establish outcome-determinative rules relating to, but not 
dictated by, U.S. treaties and statutes, it would be an awesome power.135  Youngstown, 
among other cases, regards the clause as having precisely the opposite implication: by its 
reckoning, “the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the 
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”136   
This distinction between laws and their execution – however difficult to 
rationalize137 or apply138 – has indeed been central to debates over the scope of Take Care 
authority.139  But it plays a smaller role in limiting the power conferred to take care of 
                                                 
133 GROVER CLEVELAND, PRESIDENTIAL PROBLEMS 15, 16 (1904). 
134  The difference seems significant.  The United States has argued that the capacity to initiate suit 
against a state to enforce a treaty obligation necessarily includes the authority to resolve the point in 
litigation.  U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, supra note 44, at 19.  But the difference is of course material.  In 
Sanitary District, the Court seemed to regard the Attorney General’s “execution” of the Commerce Clause 
as sufficient to establish standing, not to resolve the case.  On the other hand, in Sanitary District the only 
expression of executive authority was via the suit itself – that is, there was no pre-litigation act resembling 
the President’s VCCR memorandum. 
135 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 117, at 177 (explaining that empowering the President to use “any 
means, which he shall see fit to adopt . . . would be to clothe him with an absolute despotic power over the 
lives, the property, and the rights of the whole people.  A tyrannical President might, under a pretence of 
this sort, punish for a crime, without any trial by jury, or usurp the functions of other departments of the 
government”). 
136 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); e.g., Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006) (“The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power 
to execute in the President”) (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866)). 
137 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1789-1984 at 144 (5th rev. ed. 
1986) (“[T]he only power the legislature possesses to delegate is legislative power; yet . . . it is this power 
precisely that the legislature cannot delegate.  Conversely . . . the executive should be incapable of 
receiving or exercising anything but executive power, from which it must follow either that the executive 
can never receive any power from the legislature or that when power passes it automatically transmuted 
from legislative into executive power.”). 
138 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927-28 (1997) (suggesting intractable difficulty 
of distinguishing “between ‘making’ law and merely ‘enforcing’ it, between ‘policymaking’ and mere 
‘implementation’”). 
139 See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 83 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile it is the 
president's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it is not his duty to make laws or a law of 
the United States. . . . [F]or the president to have undertaken to make any law of the United States pertinent 
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treaties.140  The “legislative” component of treaty-making lies within Article II, and 
unlike statutes, treaties require that the President participate in lawmaking.141  The widely 
held conviction at the founding as to the need to enable the implementation of treaties – 
which, because they must allow adaptation to each state’s domestic procedures and 
conditions, are more likely to leave substantial questions of implementation unresolved – 
also suggests less compunction about giving relatively robust powers over execution; the 
founding generation was keen to enable the President to prevent treaty violations that 
might anger foreign states.142    
The diminished significance of the legislative/executive divide for treaties was 
reaffirmed during debates over the House’s role.  The Convention defeated a proposal to 
give Congress an enumerated power “to enforce treaties,” which was struck as 
“superfluous since treaties were to be ‘laws’”;143 this power to “enforce,” presumably, 
fell to the President – via the Take Care Clause – and not just to the courts.  Periodic 
attempts by the House to recapture a role for treaties touching on Article I largely 
failed,144 even as they reaffirmed the understood breadth of the President’s role: those 
advocating congressional involvement in implementation did not resist describing that 
                                                                                                                                                 
to this matter would have been to invade the domain of power expressly committed by the constitution 
exclusively to congress.”). 
140 See LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 24-25 (1990). 
141 See Hamilton’s March 29, 1796 Draft Message, supra note 61, at 559 (“The whole power of 
making treaties is therefore by the Constitution vested in the President and Senate”); see also supra text 
accompanying note 82 (describing indispensable role of President in treaty-making).  This point is 
independent of recurring disputes as to whether the treaty power as a whole is fundamentally legislative or 
executive in character. 
142 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive 
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 562 (1999).  It is difficult to overstate the felt 
significance of avoiding further U.S. violations of treaties.  See, e.g., 1 RECORDS 316 (Madison's notes) 
(“The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties have been 
formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign 
nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be 
effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole.”); DANIEL 
GEORGE LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF 
POWER (1985); FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1973); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' 
Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277 (1999).  Marshall certainly shared this view.  Brown 
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827) (explaining that under the Articles of Confederation 
“Congress . . . possessed the power of making treaties; but the inability of the federal government to 
enforce them had become so apparent as to render that power in a great degree useless.”). 
143 2 RECORDS 182 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris). 
144 Aside, that is, from the sense that particular obligations (like those involving appropriations) 
would render a treaty provision non-self-executing.  See supra text accompanying note 98. 
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role as one “executing” treaties,145 and everyone took seriously both that Congress would 
be bound by U.S. international obligations to exercise whatever powers it had146 and that 
this duty implied some powers.147  The House’s advocates, finally, did not generally 
complain that whatever authority it left on the table would fall to the President, for whom 
it would be too legislative; the main objection, rather, was that the Senate and the 
President together were usurping matters confided to Congress by Article I.148   In short, 
few seemed to have been concerned that affording the President more robust tools for 
executing treaties would trench on the legislative function.  
All this was unsurprising, again, in light of the argument from necessity, which 
resonated long after the Constitution’s ratification.  What Justice Story called “the duty of 
the national government to fulfill all the obligations of treaties” had distinctive 
significance for the President.149  In the Jonathan Robbins affair, Marshall argued that the 
Jay Treaty, and the Constitution, should not be read so as to permit the formation of 
obligations that could not be performed;150 in the absence of some contrary indication, the 
                                                 
145 So, for example, Hamilton – drafting for Washington an unused reply to the House’s request to 
participate in the Jay Treaty – stated that “the House of Representatives have no moral power to refuse the 
execution of a treaty which is not contrary to the Constitution, because it pledges the public faith; and have 
no legal power to refuse its execution because it is a law.”  Hamilton’s March 29, 1796 Draft Message, 
supra note 61, at 566; id. at 559 (critiquing the hypothesized “discretionary right in the House of 
Representatives to assent or not to a treaty, or what is equivalent, to execute it or not”).  The House 
nonetheless resolved in relevant part that when a treaty stipulated regulations on a subject falling within 
Article I, “it must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by 
Congress.”  5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796); accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1871) 
(reviving resolution).    
146 See generally HENKIN, supra note 70, at 205-06; CRS, supra note 98, at 167; U.S. Congress, 
House of Representatives, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, 
H.R. Doc. No. 104-272, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., § 596. 
147 E.g., Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619 (1842) (Story, J.) 
(“[A]lthough the power is given to the executive, with the consent of the senate, to make treaties, the power 
is nowhere in positive terms conferred upon congress to make laws to carry the stipulations of treaties into 
effect; it has been supposed to result from the duty of the national government to fulfil all the obligations of 
treaties.”).  
148 An important exception occurred during the skirmish over the 1815 commercial treaty between 
the United States and Great Britain, in which the House – seeking common ground with the Senate – 
argued in favor of “taking care” in a different sense: “Should Congress fail to legislate where legislation is 
necessary, either the public faith must be broken, or to avoid that evil, the executive branch of the 
Government must be tempted to overstep the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution.”  4 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 1020 (1816) (reprinting conference committee statement).  There is no indication, however, that the 
Senate accepted the argument.  Id. at 1022-23.   
149 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 619. 
150 See 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 23, 24-25 (C. Cullen & H. Johnson eds. 1984) 
(reprinting Virginia Federalist (Richmond, Va.), Sept. 7, 1799, at 3, col. 2) (“There must . . . have been 
some mode of carrying the provision of the treaty in this respect into execution, or else the article would be 
  
 Taking Care of Treaties 31
 
executive – the party most capable of managing foreign intercourse and preventing treaty 
violations that might endanger the young Republic151 – must step forward.152  This 
expectation that the President would actively enforce treaties was not imputed solely to 
the Take Care Clause, but the emphasis on hewing to the law suggests that the Take Care 
Clause was part of the solution.  
2. Limiting principles.  Assume now that, in theory, a treaty – including at least 
some kinds of non-self-executing treaties – is among “the Laws” eligible for execution 
under the Take Care Clause, and that the President may do more than simply comply with 
the law’s letter.  When does the President’s take care authority to implement treaties 
seem most suspect, or most above reproach?   
Both expansive and limiting applications of take care authority may be found in 
John Marshall’s formative discussions of international law.  His speech in the Jonathan 
Robbins case was certainly of the broader strain: Representative Marshall included 
treaties among the “Laws” the President had to heed, and clearly understood that this 
bestowed authority for performing those obligations.153  But Marshall charted a 
somewhat different course as Chief Justice, particularly in Brown v. United States.154  
Evaluating the President’s power to seize enemy property within the United States at the 
time war was declared – absent, in his view, clear congressional entitlement155 – Marshall 
                                                                                                                                                 
nugatory; and it would be absurd to suppose the parties meant to stipulate for a thing which could not be 
performed . . . .  The treaty has not pointed out any mode, and therefore we must recur to principles and the 
nature of things in order to discover it.”). 
151 10 ANNALS OF CONG. at 613-14 (“The [Executive] department . . . entrusted with the whole 
foreign intercourse of the nation, with the negotiation of all its treaties, with the power of demanding a 
reciprocal performance of the article, which is accountable to the nation for the violation of its engagements 
with foreign nations, and for the consequences resulting from such violation, seems the proper department 
to be entrusted with the execution of a national contract, like that under consideration.”). 
152 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800) (“The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a 
particular object.  The person who is to perform this object is marked out by the Constitution, since the 
person is named who conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.  The means by which it is to be performed, the force of the nation, are in the hands of this person.  
Ought not this person to perform the object, although the particular mode of using the means has not been 
prescribed?”). 
153 See supra note 152. 
154 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
155 That judgment would probably not be shared today.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2093-94 
(2005) (describing how Brown reflected an era in which Congress “micromanaged wars,” and the 
expectations for specific congressional authorization were greater than at any subsequent time). 
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refused to regard such seizures as lawfully executing the laws of war.  He supposed the 
claim to be that “modern usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself 
by its own force, and not through the sovereign power,” which he found inapposite: the 
laws of war might permit seizure, but did not require it, meaning an authority that was 
more legislative than executive in character.156   
Though there are plausible extrinsic explanations for the differing results in the 
Robbins affair and Brown – Marshall may have developed a more jaundiced view of 
international law, or shifted from political advocacy to a judicial frame of mind – they 
may be more easily reconciled.  It might be that treaties, but not the law of nations, were 
properly the subject of the Take Care Clause, but Marshall did not suggest that.  Nor was 
he likely to have drawn other conclusions based on formal status in domestic law: The 
treaty provision under examination in the Robbins affair may or may not have been self-
executing,157 and the laws of war at issue in Brown were arguably incorporated by 
Congress’ declaration of war and accompanying legislation.158   
The principal problem, instead, was that the customary norms at issue in Brown 
entailed too much discretion for the President to exercise under the Take Care Clause; 
they gave the sovereign authority to do something, without indicating sufficiently what it 
must do.  This so implicated the sovereign will, being so “flexible” and “subject to 
infinite modification,” that it could not be entrusted to the executive.159  The Jay Treaty 
provision at issue in the Robbins affair, in contrast, involved a defined obligation – one 
adopted at another state’s prompting – that, while not specifying the mode by which it 
                                                 
156 Brown, 12 U.S. at 128.  Justice Story thought that this misunderstood the argument.  See infra 
text accompanying note 158. 
157 Marshall certainly argued in Robbins that no further legislative action was necessary, but he 
maintained at the same time that executive action was indispensable to giving the treaty domestic legal 
relevance.  Compare supra text accompanying note 86 (quoting Marshall), with Virginia Federalist 
(Richmond, Va.), Sept. 7, 1799, at 3, col. 2, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 23, 24-25 109 
(C. Cullen & H. Johnson eds. 1984) (“There must . . . have been some mode of carrying the provision of 
the treaty in this respect into execution, or else the article would be nugatory; and it would be absurd to 
suppose the parties meant to stipulate for a thing which could not be performed. . . . The treaty has not 
pointed out any mode, and therefore we must . . . discover it.”). 
158 This was the point emphasized by Justice Story’s dissent: in his view, the declaration of war 
was an expression of legislative authority vesting the President with the capacity to exploit the right (and 
heed the limitations) established under international law.  12 U.S. at 153-54 (Story, J., dissenting). 
159 12 U.S. at 128-29. 
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was to be employed, did “enjoin[] the performance of a particular object.”160  Justice 
Story, dissenting in Brown, claimed that the customary laws of war imposed the same 
discipline, but he was unable to persuade his peers.161 
The emphasis on constraining presidential discretion echoes other elements of a 
principled approach to the Take Care Clause.  As previously explained, whether a type of 
law is eligible to be among “the Laws” to be executed depends in part on whether the law 
in question binds the President; one must also take special care to determine whether the 
provision was non-executive in character, such that executing the law would disregard a 
constitutional directive that a matter rests with Congress, or one emanating from the 
treaty-makers, that limits presidential power.  More generally, nothing gives the President 
the discretion to disregard other constitutional restrictions.162  For example, the President 
is bound, just like Congress, to refrain from “commandeering” state legislatures or state 
officials,163 and equally must respect constitutional liberties.164  This concern for 
                                                 
160 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800).  Representative Marshall did not, it should be noted, 
construe the President’s role as purely ministerial, recognizing that “policy may temper the strict execution 
of the contract.”  In particular, he left it ambiguous as to how much latitude the President might have to 
disregard the treaty obligation; “the question whether the nation has or has not bound itself” to deliver an 
accused individual was “a question the power to decide which rests alone with the Executive department,” 
and whether the nation was “bound” might or might not turn solely on the President’s legal construction of 
the treaty.  Id. at 614-15. 
161 See, e.g., 12 U.S. at 147 (Story, J., dissenting) (“I admit that the executive cannot lawfully 
transcend that limit; but if no such limit exist, the war may be, carried on according to the principles of the 
modern law of nations, and enforced when, and where, and on what property the executive chooses.”); id. 
at 149 (“[B]y what rule, then, must he be governed? I think the only rational answer is by the law of nations 
as applied to a state of war”); id. at 153-54 (“[H]e cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare 
established among civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize proceedings which 
the civilized world repudiates and disclaims.  . . . The modern usage of nations is . . . a limitation of this 
discretion.”). 
162 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (noting possible “qualifications” to the treaty 
power); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (suggesting that the treaty power could not “extend[] 
so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in 
that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent”). 
163 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal government 
may not compel a state to enact or administer a federal program); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 
(1997) (holding that the federal government may not compel state non-judicial officers to execute federal 
law).  It is unclear whether these constraints apply, with equal force, to the exercise of the treaty power – 
but if they did, they would certainly constrain the President’s authority under the Take Care Clause.  
Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 423-33 
(2003).  Notably, they do not appear to constrain the federal government’s capacity to direct state judges, at 
least in the guise of supreme federal law.  New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79 (noting that “[f]ederal statutes 
enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal 
“direction” of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.  No comparable constitutional 
provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legislate”). 
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individual rights, combined with a respect for the practice of the political branches 
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, served to deny the President authority to 
extradite individuals in the absence of treaty or statutory authorization.165  
The anti-plenary approach suggests one further consideration: whether the 
President may claim to be contributing to a system of faithful execution.   Marshall’s 
position in the Jonathan Robbins affair favored the executive over the judiciary, to a 
degree that should not overlooked,166 but he did stress that the judiciary might aid the 
President in the treaty’s execution – and emphasized that, in the matter at hand, the court 
had shown itself in agreement with the President’s authority and his particular 
determination.167  Marshall’s reasoning was later echoed in the executive branch;168 
presumably, for pragmatic reasons, the appeal to judicial authority would be stronger in 
instances where the President’s authority was more marginal.169   
All this is in keeping with the text of the Take Care Clause.  Exhorting the 
President to take care that the laws “be” faithfully executed – rather than simply stating 
that the President shall faithfully execute them170 – suggests favoring authority designed 
                                                                                                                                                 
164 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion) (stating that treaty power was limited 
by the Bill of Rights). 
165 Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936) (describing extradition as a power that “is not 
confided to the Executive in the absence of treaty or legislative provision”); id. at 10 (describing extradition 
as “rest[ing] upon the fundamental consideration that the Constitution creates no executive prerogative to 
dispose of the liberty of the individual.   Proceedings against him must be authorized by law.”).  Valentine 
is consistent with the approach taken here: As the Court noted, the treaty in question simply put the 
extradition of citizens to one side, as a matter not addressed by the agreement, so the only basis for 
executive authority was a negative one.  Id. at 10 (“[A]s the legal authority does not exist save as it is given 
by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty, it is not enough that the statute or treaty does not deny the 
power to surrender.  It must be found that statute or treaty confers the power.”).  It could not be said, 
accordingly, that the President was bound by international law do anything.  See infra text accompanying 
note 269 (discussing distinct treatment of authorizing provisions in connection with Security Council 
resolutions). 
166 See Wedgwood, supra note 64, at 339-51; see also John T. Parry, The Lost History of 
International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 93, 108-24 (2002-2003) (noting particular resistance 
to Marshall’s views about the role for the judiciary in extradition cases). 
167 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 615-16 (1800). 
168 The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15. Pet.) 518, 571 (1841) (argument of Attorney General Gilpin) (“The 
executive government was bound to take the proper steps for having the treaty executed, and these were the 
proper steps.  A treaty is the supreme law; the executive duty is especially to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed; no branch of this duty is more usual or apparent than that which is executed in 
connection with the proceedings and decrees of Courts.”). 
169 See, e.g., Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 496, 499 (1832) (urging 
strategy for avoiding collision between judicial and executive authority). 
170 Compare the immediately following instruction that the President “shall Commission all the 
Officers of the United States.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 3. 
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to promote the law’s observance even outside the executive branch.  This would not 
license the President to create courts or, for that matter, new independent agencies.171  
But it does suggest that the President is entitled to authority sufficient to promote legal 
compliance within the United States as a whole – and helping to ensure the President’s 
own obedience – and that this authority should be viewed more favorably when the take 
care authority is subject to judicial oversight.172    
The challenge, undoubtedly, lies in making that authority meaningful.  Brown 
notwithstanding, modern courts may find it challenging to assess whether excess 
discretion has been conferred, not the least in the foreign relations context – witness the 
non-delegation doctrine.173  The relevant question, as a matter of positive law, is whether 
the difficulty of policing such an elusive standard means that it should be disregarded – to 
which the Supreme Court’s answer would likely be no.174  Critically, moreover, the anti-
plenary principle does not confront the problem posed by the non-delegation doctrine – 
second-guessing Congress175 – since the entire premise is that Congress has neither 
endowed nor gainsaid take care authority.176  As discussed next, the treaty context can 
also improve considerably the task of judicial administration, and warrant giving at least 
some exercises of take care authority decisive legal effect. 
                                                 
171 See WRIGHT, CONTROL , supra note 70, at 194 (“Although the position of the President as chief 
executive does not carry with it power to create agencies for enforcing international law and treaties 
(though such a suggestion is contained in the Neagle case), it has been held to confer a power of directing 
administrative action of the agencies actually existing through instructions . . .”). 
172 Legislative oversight, too, is built into the approach.  See also infra Part IV (noting desirability 
of enhanced lawmaking in general). 
173 See Swaine, Constitutionality, supra note 13, at 1536-48 (describing general state of non-
delegation doctrine, and particular weakness in foreign affairs realm); United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (stating that “congressional legislation which is to be made 
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a 
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic 
affairs alone involved.”). 
174 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (refusing to discard non-
delegation doctrine, despite difficulties in administering the intelligible principle doctrine). 
175 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (“[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess 
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or 
applying the law.’”).  Justice Scalia was quoting his earlier dissent in Mistretta v. United States, in which 
he had further explained that “Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and 
that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers 
executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a 
debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  That explanation is one wholly sympathetic to take care authority. 
176 See infra text accompanying notes 186-197 (contrasting delegation theory at it relates to ICJ 
decisions). 
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III. TAKING CARE OF TREATIES (AND INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS) 
The argument for using take care authority to remedy U.S. breaches of its 
consular obligations may seem straightforward – and may have seemed so even prior to 
the above analysis.  A self-executing treaty, at least, incontrovertibly binds the President 
both internationally and domestically; accordingly, the President should be at liberty to 
fulfill it.  The remaining question, accordingly, is whether the treaty’s substantive and 
remedial provisions sufficiently constrain the President’s discretion so as to satisfy the 
anti-plenary principle.   
The more intriguing question is the effect of an ICJ decision.  Whatever its treaty 
basis, the actual obligation to abide by the decision is imposed by a different treaty, one 
that is not regarded as self-executing.  These two bases may even be at cross-purposes.  
For example, while the President’s VCCR memorandum purports to implement Avena, 
the executive branch has claimed that doing so is optional, and further stated that it 
considers the decision mistaken as a matter of treaty interpretation.177  Following the 
decision, then, seems either wholly discretionary or closer to the dispensing power than 
to compliance.   
All this reinforces the impression that the U.S. position was not crafted with an 
eye toward the Take Care Clause.  Nevertheless, it may be redeemed on that basis, once 
the ICJ decision is fully considered.  Doing so also informs a fresh look at the exercise of 
take care authority in the context of other international mechanisms, and even in the 
absence altogether of international intervention.  These situations are examined in turn. 
A. The Domestic Relevance of ICJ Decisions 
According to Sanchez-Llamas, an ICJ decision is entitled to “respectful 
consideration,” but could not control a treaty’s application by U.S. courts.178  The 
Supreme Court implicitly rejected any suggestion that Avena might be enforced by 
individuals in its own right – independent, that is, of its bearing on the treaty’s 
                                                 
177 See, e.g., U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, supra note 44, at 4 (“The President disagrees with the 
legal interpretations underlying the ICJ’s decision”); accord U.S. Ex Parte Medellin Brief, supra note 29, at 
33-34. 
178 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2680-84 (2006). 
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interpretation179 – by recalling that ICJ decisions have “no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case.”180   
The individuals in Sanchez-Llamas were not named in the ICJ proceedings, so 
one might take the Court to be speaking solely to the effect of an ICJ decision as 
precedent – and differentiate its effect as a judgment proper for those within the affected 
class, like Medellín.181  But the Court seems to have contemplated, consistent with the 
ICJ Statute, that the only true “parties” to ICJ proceedings were the states themselves.182  
Sanchez-Llamas’s treatment of ICJ judgments is thus of a piece with prior cases holding 
that the U.N. Charter – the source of the international obligation to adhere to ICJ 
decisions,183 including those rendered pursuant to the Optional Protocol184 – is non-self-
executing, in the sense that it may not be invoked by individuals in court.185 
This does not, however, exhaust the potential significance of ICJ judgments for 
the President.  Two potential avenues deserved consideration: first, the possibility that 
Article 94 has delegated authority to the President; and second, the possibility that take 
care authority permits the President to implement the judgment – and, at the same time, 
potentially contrary legal considerations. 
1. Delegated authority and Article 94.  The significance of ICJ decisions within 
the United States is not easily determined from the positive law.  Certainly neither the 
treaty-makers nor Congress expressly delegated to the President responsibility for 
                                                 
179 Cf. Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting from dismissal of 
certiorari) (describing Medellín’s argument that “once the United States undertakes a substantive obligation 
. . . and at the same time undertakes to abide by the result of a specified dispute resolution process . . . it is 
bound by the rules generated by that process no less than it is by the treaty that is the source of the 
substantive obligation.”). 
180 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684. 
181 Cf. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that Article 94 “does not contemplate that individuals having no relationship to the ICJ case 
should enjoy a private right to enforce the ICJ's decision.”). 
182 Id. at 2684; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 
1031, T.S. No. 993, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi (hereinafter “ICJ Statute”). 
183 U.N. CHARTER, art. 94 (providing that “[e]ach member of the United Nations undertakes to 
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party”). 
184 Optional Protocol, supra note 26, art. I (providing for ICJ jurisdiction over disputes “arising out 
of the interpretation or application of the Convention”). 
185 E.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 938 (construing Article 94 of 
U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute as indicating “no intent to vest citizens . .  . with authority to enforce an ICJ 
decision against their own government”); Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 374-75 (7th Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam) (citing cases). 
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ensuring obedience to ICJ judgments.  The U.N. Charter and the Optional Protocol 
suggest no particular role for the President;186 rather, they state an obligation that is 
incumbent upon the United States to satisfy by whatever legislative, executive, or judicial 
means it has.  (Likewise, the Senate and President, in committing the United States to 
those treaties, are best understood as incorporating whatever constitutional division of 
authority already existed.)  Conversely, while the United Nations Participation Act does 
stipulate that it is the President who directs U.S. participation before the ICJ and in the 
Security Council, it says nothing about dealing domestically with the results of an ICJ 
proceeding.187  Indeed, in explicitly addressing the President’s authority to implement 
Security Council resolutions, Congress arguably communicated its understanding that 
nothing had been, or was being, delegated in connection with the ICJ.188 
The weaknesses in the claim of delegated authority to implement ICJ decisions 
illustrate how incompletely delegation accounts fulfill the Take Care Clause.  Of course 
the two are intimately related.  In exercising delegated authority, the President ultimately 
relies on the Take Care Clause.189  Much the same work, consequently, needs to be done 
in order to sustain a claim to delegated power: If a treaty is not included among “the 
Laws” encompassed within the Clause, then no delegated authority should be claimed.  If 
one assumed that treaty-makers acted with an exact understanding of the authority 
entailed by the Take Care Clause, the scope of delegation would still require an 
understanding of the Clause itself.  
                                                 
186 But see U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, supra note 44, at 11 (contending that it “makes sense to 
read” the Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter as implicitly delegating implementing authority to the 
President). 
187 The United States has argued that one logically entails the other.  See id. at 13.  While that 
might be more coherent, it is far from a necessary entailment.  By analogy, the right to litigate on behalf of 
the United States entails a right to settle, see Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1928); 
Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch 
Discretion, 1999 WL 1262049 (O.L.C.) (June 15, 1999) – but extending the right of settlement into 
completely different legal systems is more of a stretch.  
188  See infra text accompanying notes 261-291 (discussing provisions relating to military action 
and economic and diplomatic sanctions). 
189 See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212, (1989) (describing the “discretionary 
authority that Congress may delegate to the Executive in order that the President may “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”).  Of course, the President may also claim to be exercising powers not 
delegated by Congress, such as the “executive Power.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; compare Prakash & 
Ramsey, supra note 123, and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the 
Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591 (2005), with Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. 
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH L. REV. 545 (2004).   
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It is doubtful, though, that delegations genuinely account for much of the 
authority that presidents exercise with respect to treaties.  Treaties are bilateral or 
multilateral instruments, and it will be the rare case in which the parties share an 
expectation as to which particular components of their diverse constitutional systems will 
take charge of treaty compliance.  At the domestic level, it is also unclear which 
institution would, or could, vest the equivalent of lawmaking authority in the President.190 
Absent some super-strong (and probably fictitious) presumption as to the authority that 
treaty-makers have delegated191 – one operable in other international contexts as well – it  
remains necessary to analyze what the Take Care Clause assigns as a constitutional 
default.   
Focusing on take care authority, rather than on delegation per se, also identifies 
more precisely the type of presidential authority at issue, which is interstitial and 
harmonizing in character.  In the VCCR litigation, for example, it is hard to argue that a 
particular treaty or statute, or their combination, vests the President with the specific 
authority employed – the ability to instruct state courts to comply with an ICJ judgment.  
The basic pitch instead is that the President is somehow responsible for implementing an 
obligation, imposed upon the United States as a whole, and the authority must exist 
somewhere in the Constitution, treaties, and federal code.192  Presidential authority is 
better regarded as “completing” the positive law, as a logical entailment of a set of laws, 
rather than any particular provision.193  The nature of the this responsibility, in particular 
for reconciling competing obligations, is elaborated below, but it suffices to say that this 
conception of faithful execution better explains the executive branch’s undertaking than 
does a paint-by-numbers delegation analysis.194  
                                                 
190 See Evan Criddle, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1930-31 
(2003). 
191 Professor Vazquez, for example, suggests reading a treaty as impliedly delegating to the 
President authority “to take action to comply if he believes it is the national interest to do so.”  Vázquez, 
supra note 2, at 689.  See also Van Alstine, supra note 4, at 365-67 (noting, but resisting, “a claim of 
implied comprehensive congressional authorization to enforce all formal executive actions in foreign 
affairs”). 
192 See, e.g., U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, supra note 44, at 5, 16-17. 
193 See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 20. 
194 See, e.g, U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, supra note 44, at 4 (“The President’s actions are justified 
by his authority to implement the Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter.”). 
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Bottoming this interstitial and harmonizing authority on the Take Care Clause, 
rather than straining to regard it as an implied delegation, places the constitutional focus 
in the right place.  Such authority will not, of course, invariably be upheld; to the 
contrary, the approach awakens important constraints not easily imposed on any 
delegation approach.  If, for example, one construes ordinary foreign relations statutes or 
treaties as implicitly delegating extremely broad authority to the President, it is very 
difficult to limit such hypothetical delegations,195 or to place much stock in the remnants 
of the non-delegation doctrine.196  Take care authority is premised on a narrower, and 
more contingent, understanding of the authority that the Constitution presumptively vests 
in the President.197  International adjudication, among other things, may more clearly 
specify the conditions under which presidential execution should be upheld. 
2.  Taking care of Article 94.  May the President, by executing Article 94 of the 
U.N. Charter, establish a legal effect for an ICJ decision that is otherwise lacking?198   
The threshold requirement of “law” fit for the Take Care Clause seems to be met.  
The United States is certainly obligated as a matter of international law to adhere to the 
                                                 
195 See supra text accompanying note 191 (describing various asserted delegations). 
196 See supra text accompanying note 173 (noting difficulties with doctrine). 
197 A still starker contrast is presented by the theory of inherent foreign affairs powers.  Certainly 
an adverse, unremediated ICJ decision affects U.S. foreign relations.  Cf. U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, 
supra note 44, at 4 (“[T]he United States has compelling interests in ensuring reciprocal observance of the 
Vienna Convention by treaty partners who detain U.S. citizens, promoting foreign relations, and 
reaffirming the United States’ commitment to the international rule of law”).  The desire to prevent 
imbroglios concerning America’s international obligations was fundamental to the framing.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 187-188.  But the foreign affairs power really does not need the legal bells and 
whistles.  The President’s function as the sole organ should include avoiding any debilitating controversy, 
not just those concerning legal affairs.  This might support presidential authority to implement a (non-
binding) resolution of the U.N. General Assembly condemning the death penalty, or a diplomatic protest 
from Mexico against the failure of the United States to treat Mexican interests with the respect they 
deserve.  Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States at 11-14, Medellín v. Texas, 75 U.S.L.W. 
3398, 2007 WL 120779 (April 30, 2007) (No. 06-984) (urging review based on possible damage to U.S.-
Mexico relations).  A case could even be made that foreign policy favors pardoning state prisoners on death 
row or abolishing state death penalty provisions outright.  See Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, 
Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22-23, Ex Parte José Ernesto 
Medellín, No. AP-75,207 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.).  It would be preferable to have a principled basis for 
distinguishing among these circumstances. 
198 To be clear, the President would be executing Article 94 rather than Avena itself.  It is not 
obvious that any judicial decision – as opposed to the constitutional, statutory, or treaty provision it applies 
– is the proper basis for authority under the Take Care Clause.  See HENKIN, supra note 70, at 347 n.50 
(reporting Story’s view that President lacked authority to carry out awards by foreign consuls absent 
congressional legislation); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of Laws, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 389, 399 (1987) (inquiring whether judicial decisions are among the “Laws” to be enforced, and 
tentatively answering affirmatively).   
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decision.199  Under Article 94, states “undertake[] to comply with” ICJ decisions in cases 
to which they are parties; this undertaking would be undermined were parties to assume 
obligations no greater than those for non-parties,200 or if the legal significance of 
decisions were indistinct from that of advisory opinions.201  Any ambiguity in the Charter 
should be resolved by the general duty of states under international law to comply with 
the decisions of international tribunals to which they have submitted disputes.202  While 
Article 94(2) also provides for possible referral to the Security Council in the event of 
noncompliance, this scarcely detracts from the international legal obligation to comply.203    
Whether non-self-executing treaties like the U.N. Charter bind the President under 
domestic law is admittedly a closer question,204 and Article 94(2) makes it yet more 
difficult.  Although Sanchez-Llamas addressed individual enforcement only, it implied 
that international remedies like that afforded by Article 94(2) are inconsistent with any 
domestic legal effect.205  For reasons previously explored, this would invert the 
                                                 
199 This has been the U.S. position, win or lose.  See, e.g., U.S. Medellín v. Texas Brief, supra note 
44, at 4 (describing the “United States’ international law obligation to comply with . . . Avena”]); 80 DEP’T 
STATE BULL., July 1980, at 69 (statement proclaiming that “[u]nder the U.N. Charter, Iran is bound to obey 
the Court’s judgment” in hostages proceedings, and must do so “to pursue its international interests as a 
law-abiding member of the international community, entitled to the respect and cooperation of other 
nations”); cf. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(“The United States' contravention of an ICJ judgment may well violate principles of international law.”). 
200 See also ICJ Statute, supra note 182, art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”). 
201 Compare U.N. CHARTER, art. 96 (advisory opinion function).   
202 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 127 (1965) 
(explaining that Article 94 “merely casts in the form of a conventional rule that which already exists as a 
general principle of customary international law. . . .”); accord Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of 
International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2-3 (1960). 
203 See LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND 
DOCUMENTS 555-58 (3d ed. 1969); 2 BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 1174-79 (2nd ed. 2002).  As the State Department Legal Adviser explained when the Charter 
was originally under consideration, the point of adding Article 94(2) was not to detract from the legal 
standing of Article 94(1) and ICJ decisions, but rather to reinforce their significance; the uncertain prospect 
of Security Council action seems to have been fully appreciated, and undermines any suggestion that it was 
essential to the decisions’ force.  The Charter of the United Nations, Hearings before the Senate Comm. 
Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 331 (1945) (Green H. Hackworth) (“[A]ll that was intended by 
[Article 94(2)] was to show that the states expected that the decisions of the Court would be complied with, 
and that if they were not complied with, the complaining party would have a right to bring the matter to the 
attention of the Council for whatever that might be worth.”).  
204 See supra text accompanying notes 94-114. 
205 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684-85 (“While each member of the United Nations has 
agreed to comply with decisions of the ICJ ‘in any case to which it is a party,’ . . .  the Charter's procedure 
for noncompliance – referral to the Security Council by the aggrieved state – contemplates quintessentially 
international remedies . . .”). 
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appropriate presumption: If Article 94 does impose an international legal obligation, it 
ordinarily comprises a “law” that the President must execute under the Take Care Clause.  
Article 94, furthermore, seems to fall comfortably within the category of non-self-
executing obligations that, even if not appropriate for judicial enforcement by 
individuals, may be available for presidential implementation – so-called “executive” 
treaties.  Nothing in it necessarily requires the President to exercise authority that is 
peculiarly within the province of Congress.  Nor does it appear that the treaty-makers or 
Congress tried to displace presidential authority; Article 94 simply left to the states 
parties the means of adhering to decisions in their particular constitutional systems.206  As 
an initial matter, therefore, the Take Care Clause would seem to incorporate presidential 
actions that hew to obligations created by Article 94 – as where the executive order sticks 
to the parties specified by the ICJ (like Medellín), and makes responsible only those 
subject to the judgment and the underlying treaty (like the states maintaining custody of 
those whose rights were violated).207   
The anti-plenary principle also asks whether the treaty binding the President 
affords an inappropriate degree of discretion.  Nothing suggests that would invariably or 
routinely be the case.  A typical ICJ judgment is more specific than the average treaty 
provision, self-executing or otherwise.  Were Article 94 considered instead on an as-
applied basis, Avena would fare well: Avena itself followed other increasingly specific 
                                                 
206 To that extent, at least, it supports the view expressed in U.S. briefs that the political branches 
“would have discretion to choose how to comply” with ICJ judgments.  See, e.g., Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 34, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-
5928).  But that does not give the President, upon U.S. ratification, the authority to refuse altogether.  The 
failure presupposed by Article 94(2) might occur despite the President’s best efforts: other domestic actors 
might continue their violations nonetheless; Congress might override presidential efforts; or constitutional 
restrictions might inhibit the President’s efforts.  Even if Article 94(2) somehow implies an elective 
capacity on the President’s part, consistent with the Constitution, to engage in massive resistance of ICJ 
decisions – “[i]n particular circumstances,” to “decide that the United States will not comply with an ICJ 
decision and, if Security Council measures are proposed, direct a veto, consistent with the United Nations 
Charter,” see U.S. Ex Parte Medellin Brief, supra note 29, at 21 – that would simply spell the end of any 
take care authority. 
207 It should be acknowledged, though, that this construction depends on the U.S. government’s 
understanding that the ICJ’s decision equates to the judgment.  Compare Avena, supra note 1, at ¶ 151 
(indicating that “the conclusions reached . . . in the present Judgment do . . . apply to other foreign nationals 
finding themselves in similar situations in the United States”), with U.S. Ex Parte Medellin Brief, supra 
note 29, at 31 (stressing that the determination “applies only to the 51 individuals whose rights were 
determined in the Avena case.  The scope of the President’s determination is thus consistent with the scope 
of the ICJ’s decision with respect to each of the individual cases before it.”); id. at 18 n.2 (noting 
understanding of judgment). 
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ICJ decisions, and required that the United States establish a judicial process to perform a 
particular task (“review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences”), under a 
particular standard (actual prejudice), and subject to a particular constraint (barring use of 
procedural default rules).208  While the judgment certainly left some room for debate, as 
would any judicial decision, it was far from a blank check.209  To be sure, the ICJ left it to 
the United States to implement the judgment “by means of its own choosing.”210  But less 
was left to the President’s own choosing.  The ICJ engendered a binary decision – 
according to which the United States complied with, or defied, its judgment – with 
indifference as to which domestic actor, and by which domestic procedure, that judgment 
was executed; on the view presented here, the U.S. choice was made by the Take Care 
Clause.  If that was insufficiently constraining, it calls into question a wide range of 
presidential power. 
Finally, the President’s memorandum also appears to contribute to a system of 
faithful execution.  The ICJ itself indicated that the Avena judgment was to be 
administered by courts and, to that extent, limited the President’s discretion.  The 
memorandum reiterated that role – “by having State courts give effect to the decision in 
accordance with general principles of comity in cases” – and further enhanced the 
judicial responsibility by leaving to the courts the articulation of any actual prejudice 
standards, as well as the application of that standard to particular cases.    
3.  Taking care of legal conflicts.  Discussion to this point has danced around a 
central problem beautifully illustrated by the Medellín mess – that laws and decisions do 
not always align.  Not only did the executive branch steadfastly resist the ICJ’s approach 
to the VCCR, but it continues to regard Avena as wrongly decided.211  This means that 
the presidential memorandum, while citing the VCCR as one of its legal bases, appears to 
have opted for Avena at the expense of what it deems to be the better understanding of 
                                                 
208 Avena, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 153(9), 140-41, 121, 113. 
209 To illustrate, Justice Breyer’s suggestion in Sanchez-Llamas that procedural default hearings 
might be satisfactory “review and reconsideration,” and that default rules might be maintained if states 
afforded alternatives like ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 
2669, 2699-2700 (2006) (Breyer, J, dissenting), was easily dismissed as having been foreclosed by the ICJ.  
126 S. Ct. at 2686 n.6; see Bradley, supra note 99, at 107 (calling argument “creative”).  
210 Avena, supra note 1, at 72. 
211 See supra text accompanying note 177. 
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the VCCR.  As if that weren’t enough, the President’s asserted power to override state 
procedural default rules seems to contradict earlier representations that the United State 
was bound – at least in the absence of further legislation – to respect state law.212  This 
arguably undermines any claim by the President to be faithfully executing the law. 
Appearances notwithstanding, the take care approach is tailor-made for instances 
like these, in which multiple obligations need to be completed and reconciled within the 
national legal order.  Such problems do not resolve themselves.  The international plane 
permits pervasive conflicts among treaty obligations,213 even within the same treaty 
scheme; for example, once the Optional Protocol’s dispute resolution mechanism has run 
its course, the ICJ’s opportunity to redress conflicts between its decisions and its sense of 
the underlying treaties is sharply circumscribed.214  The international order, furthermore, 
maintains indifference toward any further complications added by domestic law, such as 
those arising in a federal system.215  Even domestically, discrepancies are routine when 
the federal government is administering a single statute, let alone several treaties and 
related statutes. 
The Take Care Clause gives a limited authority to resolve this sort of conflict in 
entrusting the President not with executing “the Law,” but rather with taking care of “the 
Laws.”216  Even if this means, literally, each and every law – rather than all laws 
simultaneously – this vests the President with responsibility for executing the greater 
mass of laws, a function that requires exercising discretion not prescribed by any 
                                                 
212 See supra text accompanying note 23.  These comments did not address whether Congress was 
powerless; presumably the less said about the full extent of federal authority, particularly that which could 
not be guaranteed, the better. 
213 SEYAD ALI SADAT-AKHAVI, METHODS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN TREATIES (2003); 
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law at 10-20, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006). 
214 The ICJ is permitted to revisit its decision upon the application of a party to it.  See ICJ Statute, 
supra note 182, art. 60.  But that provision has only been successfully employed twice.  See ROSENNE’S 
THE WORLD COURT 124 (Terry D. Gill ed. (6th rev. ed. 2003). 
215 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 339 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty.”); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 ¶28 (Provisional Measures of Mar. 3) 
(stating that “the international responsibility of a State is engaged by the action of the component organs 
and authorities acting in that State, whatever they may be”). 
216 Michael Van Alstine, who was uncommonly attentive in high school, informs me that this is 
the difference between an uncountable noun and a countable plural. 
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particular one.217  The President must heed the laws’ hierarchy in seeing to their 
execution – for example, by recognizing conflicts between the Constitution and statutory 
responsibilities218  and preferring later-in-time statutes and treaties.219  Conflicts between 
the executive branch’s understanding of a legal source and the judiciary’s are also 
commonplace.  While faithful execution might conceivably require the President to 
persist in the face of adverse precedent, the argument is just as often put the opposite 
way,220 and there are compelling reasons for permitting discretion as to when to yield.221  
To be sure, the obligation to follow the ICJ is not equal to the obligation to follow the 
Supreme Court.222  But the pragmatic arguments are nonetheless compelling – certainly, 
an obligation to observe preferred national constructions in the teeth of adverse 
                                                 
217 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Unlike an administrative commission confined to the enforcement of the statute under which 
it was created . . . the President is a constitutional officer charged with taking care that a mass of legislation 
be executed”); Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59, 60 
(1981) (“The ‘take care’ clause charges the President with the function of coordinating the execution of 
many statutes simultaneously”); CORWIN, supra note 137, at 144 (“[A]ny particular statute is but a single 
strand of a vast fabric of laws demanding enforcement; nor . . . can all these be enforced with equal vigor, 
or with the same vigor at all times.  The President’s duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ 
has come, then, to embrace a broad power of selection among the laws for this purpose’”); cf. Van der 
Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1936) (“Congress requested and directed the 
President to give notice of the termination of the treaty provisions in conflict with the act.  . . . [I]t was 
incumbent upon the President, charged with the conduct of negotiations with foreign governments and also 
with the duty to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, to reach a conclusion as 
to the inconsistency between the provisions of the treaty and the provisions of the new law.”). 
218 This is hotly contested, but the view seems to have had bipartisan support within the executive 
branch.  Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
199 (1994), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm; see generally Dawn E. Johnsen, 
Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 
2004 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (describing ongoing debate).  
219 Cf. Presidential Discretion to Delay Making Determinations under the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 19 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 306 (1995) 
(stating that “[i]n general, if the President's legal obligations appear to conflict, we believe that his 
overriding duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’  . . .  requires him to attempt to discover 
some reasonable means by which the conflict could be resolved and both duties discharged.”); id. (given 
conflict between the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act and the 
National Security Act, the former (and later-arising) should preferred since Congress anticipated tensions 
within the prior statute). 
220 See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1389-90 (1991).  As Professor Merrill has observed, the question turns in part on 
whether judicial decisions are themselves regarded as among “the Laws” that are to be faithfully executed.  
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 43, 54 (1993); see supra text accompanying note 198.  
221 Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159-64 (1984) (holding that doctrine of nonmutual 
offensive collateral estoppel does not apply against the United States). 
222 If for no other reason than that the Supreme Court’s position is constitutionally reinforced.  
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2673 (2006) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1  Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803)). 
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international awards would play havoc with any duty to comply223 – and the obligation to 
comply with an ICJ judgment plausibly trumps the need to stick to the executive branch’s 
own view of the treaty,224 at least when the judgment had a rational basis.225 
One aspect of the President’s VCCR memorandum particularly strains the Take 
Care Clause argument: namely, that the treaty provision being followed (Article 94 of the 
U.N. Charter) is considered non-self-executing, while the treaty being betrayed (the 
VCCR) is self-executing.  But this is not fatal.  As previously explained, conventional 
distinctions between self-execution and non-self-execution are inapposite to questions of 
presidential authority, and there are contrary hierarchical principles on the other side – in 
particular, deference to judicial constructions.226  The limitations on the President’s 
authority are also worth recalling.  The international obligation to comply with the ICJ 
strictly limits its injunctive potential,227 and it would be a different matter (and nearly 
inexplicable) were the memorandum to extend Avena to other U.S. cases while 
                                                 
223 See supra text accompanying note 202 (describing international duty to comply).  The United 
States has previously regarded itself as bound to accept arbitral awards “even in the fact of a decision 
proclaiming certain theories of law which it cannot accept.”  Letter from the Secretary of State to the 
Norwegian Minister (Bryn), Feb. 26, 1923, reprinted in 2 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1923 (1938). 
224 Or even, arguably, the obligation to adhere to the reasoning of the Supreme Court.  See Breard 
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (per curiam) (finding state procedural default rules consistent with 
the VCCR); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682-88 (2006) (same).  The United States has 
stated that “[j]ust as Breard would not stand in the way of legislation that provided for the implementation 
of the Avena decision, it does not stand in the way of the President’s determination that the Avena decision 
should be given effect.”  U.S. Ex Parte Medellin Brief, supra note 29, at 34.  But this compares 
unfavorably with Marshall’s declaration, in his Jonathan Robbins speech, that “[t]he treaty, stipulating that 
a murderer shall be delivered up to justice, is as obligatory as an act of Congress making the same 
declaration” (see supra text accompanying note 86); in Medellín, rather than saying that Article 94 (or the 
ICJ decision) is akin to an act of Congress, the United States is likening the presidential memorandum to 
such an act.  The difference is substantial, particularly on the anti-plenary principle.  
225 Indeed, had the executive branch espoused the ICJ’s view in Breard and Sanchez-Llamas, it 
probably would have prevailed.  Cf. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2685 (2006) (noting, 
following remark that the ICJ’s views were due “respectful consideration,” that the executive branch’s 
understanding of the VCCR was due “great weight”) (internal quotations omitted). 
226 It would be especially difficult to contend that non-self-executing obligations are irrelevant 
altogether.  The Take Care Clause should permit the consideration of legal rules not directly within its 
compass – such as state law, which by hypothesis is not among “the laws” for the President (see supra note 
79) – in the proper execution of other laws that are.  In Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922), the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Attorney General’s authority, despite the absence of express statutory license, 
to transfer a federal prisoner to state court for trial on state criminal charges.  Such authority might be 
located, the Court reasoned, in the Take Care Clause, in (seemingly tangential) statutory authority generally 
allowing federal officials to see to the safety and custody of U.S. prisoners, and principles of comity.  Id. at 
261-63. 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 180-182 (noting parties encompassed by Article 94 
obligation). 
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continuing to maintain that it was wrong on its merits.228  Treaty terms, as reckoned by 
the executive branch and U.S. cases, still limit the scope of the President’s discretion in 
every other regard.  The origin of these limits also bears mention.  It is the U.N. Charter 
and the Optional Protocol, consented to by the Senate, that limit the President’s authority 
under the VCCR in the event of dispute resolution, not some unilateral choice by the 
executive branch.  Respecting these limits to take care authority is consistent with 
Representative Marshall’s admonition that “Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the 
mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the contract.”229  
 
* * * 
The VCCR controversy is unusual in important regards.  The odds that the ICJ 
and the Supreme Court will show such mutual and sustained interest in U.S. treaty 
breaches are rather long, and not improved by the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol.230   
Nevertheless, the issues posed by the controversy are of continuing significance, 
and Article 94 remains very much in play.  The United States is party to over 75 treaties 
providing for ICJ jurisdiction, including important multilateral agreements on human 
rights,231 intellectual property,232 the environment,233 and international criminal law,234 as 
                                                 
228 That position would, however, be compatible with a claim to the exercise of the President’s 
foreign affairs powers, which may often subordinate legal to political considerations. 
229 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800). 
230 But see Van Alstine, supra note 4, at 366 (noting the “exceptional constellation of treaties” at 
issue in the VCCR controversy, “which is unlikely to recur”). 
231 See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984).  
232 See, e.g., Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, art. 15, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 
U.N.T.S. 178, T.I.A.S. 7868; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, art. 59, 28 US.T. 7645, 1160 
U.N.T.S. 231, TIAS 8733; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 
28, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
233 See, e.g., UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, art. 14, 31 I.L.M. 
849; Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 
293, 26 I.L.M. 1529. 
234 See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, art. 16, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 203, 18 I.L.M. 1456; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 12, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; United Nations Convention 
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well as numerous bilateral treaties.235  While many of these obligations are born of an era 
when the United States was (somewhat) more enamored of international tribunals,236 it 
has continued to enter into treaties that rely on the ICJ to resolve disputes – even 
volunteering for ICJ jurisdiction when it is not required, just as it did in entering the 
Optional Protocol.237  Accordingly, it is entirely possible that the United States will again 
be the respondent, and the loser, in ICJ proceedings.  If recent cases are any indication, 
the jurisdictional basis for the claim against the United States may not be apparent until 
the time of filing.238 
 
B. Beyond Article 94: Taking Care of Other International Law 
While ICJ decisions under Article 94 have continuing significance, they capture 
only part of the potential compliance and take care issues facing the U.S. government.  
Analogous problems may be posed by other kinds of international decisions, and by 
treaties in which no decision is rendered at all. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, art. 32, Treaty Doc. 
101-4, 28 I.L.M. 493. 
235 These include friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties with states that are not 
always on the friendliest terms.  See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 
15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, art. 21, 8 U.S.T. 899; Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, U.S.-Pak.,  
12 U.S.T. 110; Convention of Establishment, Protocol, and Declaration, Nov. 25, 1959, U.S.-Fr., 11 U.S.T. 
2398. 
236  In modern bilateral investment treatments, successors to many of the FCN treaties, such 
provisions have been replaced with state-to-state arbitration options.  See Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), art. 37, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdfA. 
237 The U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, for example, provided for ICJ 
jurisdiction over disputes when state parties could not promptly agree to the terms of arbitration, but 
allowed states to opt out of that provision.  See U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Dec. 13, 2000, arts. 35(2)-(3), S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-16, 2000 WL 34248775.  The United States did not.  
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Declarations and Reservations, 
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html#declaration. 
238 In addition to the VCCR cases, see Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v 
United States of America), Judgment [2003] I.C.J. 161 (merits judgment premised on Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (merits judgment premised in part on Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation); Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 9 (Order 
of Feb. 22) (relying on Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian 
Aviation and Convention on International Civil Aviation). 
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1. International judicial and arbitral decisions.  The United States is a party to 
hundreds of treaties providing for various forms of ad hoc arbitration, compulsory dispute 
resolution, or other means of resolving treaty-based disputes.239  If the take care theory 
described here is accepted, such arrangements may give rise to presidential authority: that 
is, if an adverse finding against the United States is legally binding as a matter of 
international and domestic law, if the President’s authority is not displaced by Congress 
or by the Constitution, and if the obligation does not vest the President with excessive 
discretion, the President must yet exercise that authority consistent with the international 
decision and with other federal law. 
Notwithstanding these conditions, the President’s take care authority may seem to 
be of worrisome breadth, so it is useful to note examples of its limitations.  The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) is the international organization that most frequently presses 
for U.S. accommodation.  Its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) employs appointed panels 
and a permanent Appellate Body to adjudicate disputes between members; once this 
process has run its course, failure to comply with the rulings or recommendations of the 
terminal DSB report may result in a further decision authorizing the winning party to 
impose trade sanctions on the loser.240  Whether DSB reports are appropriate for the 
exercise of take care authority might in theory turn on whether the reports are binding 
under international law,241 or whether the remedy was within the President’s 
constitutional competence (as might be questioned, for example, if the violation was 
inherent in a federal statute).242  But domestic legislation probably resolves the matter.  
According to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, no WTO provision overrides U.S. 
                                                 
239 See Ku, supra note 3, at 31 (suggesting that a review of treaties indicated “that the U.S. is a 
party to nearly 300 agreements to international dispute resolution”). 
240 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Annex 2, 
Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1226-27 (1994).  Under the 
DSU, if a member state has not complied with a final panel or Appellate Body report’s rulings or 
recommendations within a reasonable period of time, the DSB may authorize compensation or suspension 
of concessions.  Id. arts. 21-22. 
241 See John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation 
to Comply or Option to "Buy Out"?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (2004) (arguing that reports are binding, and 
reviewing debate). 
242 This is usually the case.  See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report: United States--Subsidies on 
Upland Cotton, WT/DS 267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Cotton Report], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/267abr_e.pdf. 
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law.243  Consistent with that, DSB reports were made non-self-executing in the deepest, 
non-executive, sense: according to the legislative history, some or all reports can be 
implemented only via statute,244 and they do not bind the executive branch or justify 
altering federal law.245  In so doing, Congress and the executive branch both 
acknowledged the potential for presidential authority and averted it. 
The President’s authority under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) is also cabined, albeit in a different fashion.  Chapter 19 allows review of U.S. 
antidumping and countervailing duties by binational arbitral panels, the decisions of 
which are final and binding.246  By statute, those decisions bind U.S. agencies, which puts 
to rest any question of their status in domestic law – and, by the same token, gives rise to 
take care authority under the implementing statute rather than under NAFTA itself.247  
That responsibility is relaxed if part of the implementing statute is held unconstitutional, 
                                                 
243 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102(a)(1)-(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1)-(2); accord Uruguay 
Round Agreements, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, pt. 1, at 659 (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040 [hereinafter SAA]; see 19 U.S.C. §3512(d) (providing that the SAA 
is authoritative). 
244 H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt. 1, at 25 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773 (“[A]ny 
dispute settlement findings that a U.S. statute is inconsistent with an agreement also cannot be implemented 
except by legislation approved by the Congress unless consistent implementation is permissible under the 
terms of the statute.”); see also S. REP NO. 103-412, at 13 (1994).  The SAA is somewhat broader, 
indicating that the same principle applies to any federal law (not just statutes) deemed WTO-incompatible.  
SAA, supra note 243, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1032-33, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4318 (“Reports issued by 
panels or the Appellate Body under the DSU have no binding effect under the law of the United States . . .  
If a report recommends that the United States change federal law to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay 
Round agreement, it is for the Congress to decide whether any such change will be made.”).  The SAA (but 
not the Act) also declares that the agreement lacks effect on state law, and that DSB reports likewise do not 
“automatically” preempt state law, but does not directly opine whether implementation is reserved for 
Congress.  SAA, supra note 243, H.R. DOC. NO. 316, at 670, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4050. 
245 Id. at 1032-33, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4318 (“[N]either federal agencies nor state governments 
are bound by any finding or recommendation included in such reports. . . . [P]anel reports do not provide 
legal authority for federal agencies to change their regulations or procedures or refuse to enforce particular 
laws or regulations . . .”).  The overall intent seems to be to foreclose using take care authority in any 
judicial context.  See id. (“[T]he United States will not seek to introduce a panel report into evidence in any 
civil suit brought by the United States challenging a state law or regulation on the ground that it is 
inconsistent with a Uruguay Round agreement”).  The President might yet try to construe U.S. statutory law 
in a manner consistent, if possible, with the results of dispute settlement process.  See supra note 244 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-826); e.g., Hyundai Electronics Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 
1343-44 (C.I.T. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 
(1804)). 
246 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.- U.S., art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. 
289. 
247 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (providing that for certain decisions made by a binational panel 
or extraordinary challenge committee, “the administering authority or the Commission shall, within the 
period specified by the panel or committee, take action not inconsistent with the decision”). 
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in which case the President has discretion to “accept” an adverse decision on behalf of 
the United States.248  Perhaps this implies that the President otherwise lacks such 
discretion – or, more likely, it is simply a severance provision – but again that is a 
function of the statutory scheme. 
Not all agreements are so carefully neutralized, and it is worth turning to a third 
and unresolved example: the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).249  
Despite bipartisan support for U.S. ratification,250 significant opposition remains, 
including legal concerns about provisions that delegate authority to UNCLOS 
institutions.251  One hot button is the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which has compulsory jurisdiction over disputes relating 
to the treaty’s seabed provisions.252  Article 39 of Annex VI provides that Chamber 
decisions “shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner 
as judgments or orders of the highest court of th[at] State Party.”253  The United States is 
contemplating a declaration to render Chamber decisions enforceable “only in accordance 
with procedures established by implementing legislation,” subject to any constitutionally-
required review, and “without precedential effect in any court of the United States.”254  
Article 39 would also be subject to a second, more general declaration concerning non-
self-execution.255   
The first declaration may be founded on a (misplaced) objection to placing 
Chamber decisions on a footing equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court.256  Both 
                                                 
248 Id. § 1516a(g)(7)(B) (holding that, in such event, the relevant agencies must “take action not 
inconsistent with such decision”).  One such challenge was recently rebuffed, with the court noting the very 
limited jurisdiction of U.S. courts over the binational process.  Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, 
Executive Committee v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
249 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
250 E.g., Former Legal Advisers' Letter on Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 307 (2004). 
251 See, e.g., Ku, supra note 3, at 64-65; Jack Goldsmith & Jeremy Rabkin, A Treaty the Senate 
Should Sink, WASH. POST, July 2, 2007, at A19. 
252 UNCLOS, supra note 249, art. 188b. 
253 UNCLOS, supra note 249, annex VI, art. 39. 
254 See Proposed Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification, § 3(22), S. Exec. Rep. 
No. 108-10 at 21 (2004), reprinted in 150 Cong. Rec. S2712 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2004) (setting out proposed 
declarations and understandings, as approved by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations). 
255  Id. § 3(24), S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10 at 22. 
256 Cf. S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10, supra note 254, at 14 (noting, without describing, “potential 
constitutional concerns regarding direct enforceability of [Article 39] in U.S. courts”); Ku, supra note 3, at  
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declarations, however, are designed to prevent private parties from invoking Chamber 
decisions in U.S. courts257 – raising the question whether these would amount to treaty 
reservations, which are not permitted under the UNCLOS,258 or at least prevent the 
United States from complying with its obligation to ensure judicial enforcement of 
Chamber decisions.  These repercussions may be tempered by the availability of take care 
authority.  The President could, consistent with the UNCLOS, pursue the enforcement of 
Chamber decisions in U.S. courts, thereby mitigating any violation arising from the U.S. 
bias against private enforcement.259  It is a finer question whether that approach would be 
consistent with the proposed declarations, were they finally adopted by the Senate as a 
whole260 – but if they clarified the President’s role, that would ratify an authority that the 
President would have enjoyed in the absence of any declarations at all. 
2. International legislative decisions.  Just as international tribunals have 
challenged domestic conceptions of courts and the judicial role, international institutions 
increasingly challenge domestic distinctions between legislative and executive power.261  
The United Nations Security Council is one such hybrid, and it poses take care issues – 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 (hinting at constitutional objections relating to Supreme Court authority).  The provision appears, on its 
face, to be designed to insure the finality of decisions, not to threaten the Supreme Court’s authority over 
the rendering of precedent in U.S. courts. 
257 S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10, supra note 254, at 14 (noting problems posed by direct enforcement 
of Article 39 decisions); id. at 15 (explaining that “this declaration states that the Convention and 
Agreement do not create private rights of action or other enforceable legal rights in U.S. courts”); id. at 
177, 178 (reprinting responses to additional questions submitted by William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, 
Department of State) (noting concerns regarding private enforcement of Article 39 decisions, and 
suggesting the possibility of a U.S. understanding). 
258 Ku, supra note 3, at 65; see UNCLOS, supra note 249, art. 309 (“No reservations or exceptions 
may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.”). 
259 S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10, supra note 254, at 14 (noting that “article 39 does not require any 
particular manner in which Chamber decisions must be made enforceable”).  But see id. at 177, 178 (Taft 
responses) (suggesting that, absent understanding, the UNCLOS would require that Chamber decisions be 
enforceable through private causes of action). 
260 In submissions to the Senate, the executive branch noted the possibility of executive 
implementation of UNCLOS obligations through executive orders or less formal means, without specific 
reference to Article 39.  S. Exec. Rep. No. 108-10, supra note 254, at 177, 178 (Taft responses).  Proposed 
declaration 22, however, might be read to exclude executive implementation prior to the adoption of 
implementing legislation, despite the fact that it appears to have been aimed at precluding private 
enforcement only.  See supra text accompanying note 254. 
261 See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 61-63 (2005) 
(describing emerging and distinctive character of international lawmaking); cf. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 
International Legislation, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1255, 1255 (Rudolf 
Bernhardt ed., 1995) (suggesting that international legislation should be assessed, approximately, by 
criteria used for domestic legislation). 
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quite apart from its function in enforcing ICJ decisions – that illustrate the risks and 
rewards of the theory.   
The Security Council’s best-known function involves its capacity to authorize 
Member States to use force in circumstances that would otherwise violate international 
law.262  These decisions, though rare, have potentially dramatic consequences under U.S. 
law.  President Truman, for example, cited Security Council support for military action in 
Korea;263 President George H.W. Bush indicated that Council authorization would suffice 
to license invasion of Iraq;264 and President Clinton invoked U.N. authority to invade 
Haiti.265  Each treated Security Council authorization as a critical, if not necessary 
indispensable, component of his domestic legal justification. 
The take care theory espoused here offers little support.  Relying solely on 
Security Council authorization trenches on Congress’ war powers.266  The U.N. 
Participation Act, moreover, not only establishes a different mechanism for assisting the 
United Nations – special agreements under Article 43, which have never been pursued – 
but further requires congressional approval of such agreements,267 and seems to signal 
Congress’ view that the President is not entitled to respond independently in the wake of 
Security Council authorization.268  More fundamentally, Article 42 resolutions authorize 
                                                 
262 U.N. CHARTER, art. 42.  
263 Consistently but disingenuously, apparently.  Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents 
Acting under the UN and NATO, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 1259-64 (1997). 
264 Id. at 1264-69 (citing statements by Bush and Cheney); Thomas M. Franck, Declare War? 
Congress Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at A27; for a rebuttal, see The Gulf War: Collective Security, 
War Powers and Laws of War, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 8-13 (1991) (remarks of Peter Raven-
Hansen).   
265 Fisher, supra note 263, at 1270-71. 
266 E.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND 
ITS AFTERMATH 11 (1993).  But see Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: . 
The Old Order Changeth, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 63, 74 (1991) (“When the President commits U.S. forces to a 
UN police action in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, it is because the U.S. Government is obliged 
by international law to comply. Such compliance by the President with international law is not prohibited – 
indeed, it is required – by the Constitution.”); David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The 
Revolutionary Transformation of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491 (1999) (arguing for 
internationalist transformation of war powers). 
267 The Act permits the President to negotiate Article 43 agreements with the Security Council, 
subject to congressional approval; the President is not required to seek additional authorization before 
acting under an agreement.   22 U.S.C. § 287d. 
268   The Act notes, cautiously, that nothing in it “shall be construed as an authorization to the 
President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council . . . armed forces, facilities, or 
assistance” beyond those specified in the special agreements.  Id.  Compare, e.g., ELY, supra note 266, at 
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military action by Member States, but do not require anything of them.  As suggested by 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Brown v. United States, there is a meaningful 
difference between international obligations that enjoin every state actor, including the 
President, to accomplish something, and measures that allow the United States to do 
something it otherwise could not – without dictating whether it should be done by the 
President or someone else.269 
Military action, with its special international and domestic rules, is no longer the 
Security Council’s stock in trade.  Since the end of the Cold War, the Council has 
increasingly employed its authority under Article 41 to adopt “measures not involving the 
use of armed force” – principally economic sanctions – and to call on Member States to 
apply them.270  These decisions are binding under international law;271 unlike use of force 
decisions, moreover, they are often injunctive rather than merely permissive in character.  
Nonetheless, they do not routinely pose take care issues.  The President has longstanding 
domestic statutory authority to adopt economic sanctions,272 and the U.N. Participation 
Act specifically authorizes the President to implement Security Council decisions taken 
pursuant to Article 41.273  Appropriately, recent executive branch orders have cited the 
Act as a legal basis, “in view of” Security Council resolutions, rather than claiming to 
implement resolutions of their own accord.274 
But take care authority may nevertheless be relevant.  First, when the Security 
                                                                                                                                                 
151-52 n.60 (construing U.N. Participation Act to gainsay presidential action); Fisher, supra note 263, at 
1249-54 (same), with Franck & Patel, supra note 266, at 69-70. 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 154-161 (discussing Brown).  This is consistent with the 
view espoused by some that the Security Council resolutions “authorize[ing]” Member States to use 
military force are not legally binding upon them.  See 1 SIMMA, supra note 203, at 463. 
270 U.N. CHARTER, art. 41. 
271 U.N. CHARTER, art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”); id. art. 48 (“The action required 
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security 
shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may 
determine,” and “[s]uch decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and 
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.”); see 1 SIMMA, 
supra note 203, at 739. 
272 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§1701-06 (2000); Dames 
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981) (broadly construing presidential authority under IEEPA). 
273 22 U.S.C. § 287c.  
274 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
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Council adopts a decision without invoking Article 41,275 the U.N. Participation Act is 
literally inapplicable – and yet the Council decision may bind the President.276  Second, 
decisions may require immediate implementation before legislation can be adopted – 
unlike a treaty, the ratification of which may be delayed until domestic conformance is 
certain.277  Third, the breadth of recent resolutions suggests that the Security Council may 
adopt measures exceeding authority delegated to the President under the U.N. 
Participation Act or other domestic statutes: there is a difference, certainly, between the 
“economic relations,” “means of communication,” and property subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction covered by the Act, and any measure “not involv[ing] ‘the use of force,’” 
which is the only topical limitation on the Council’s authority under Article 41.278 
Most of the Council’s work has little to do with the United States and the 
President’s take care authority.279  The U.S. veto in the Security Council minimizes the 
chances that the United States will be subject to unwelcome obligations280 – meaning 
                                                 
275 See, e.g., S.C. Res 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/1540 
(2004), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 1237 (2004) (regulating the prevent proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and delivery systems); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/955 (1994) (creating International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia). 
276 This is uncontroversial with respect to decisions taken under Chapter VII that simply fail to 
reference Chapter 41 (and which do not involve the use of force).  There is also a credible argument that 
Article 25 makes legally binding measures not taken under Chapter VII at all.  1 SIMMA, supra note 203, at 
456-58 (concluding that maintaining to the contrary is “not tenable,” and citing other possible sources of 
authority); James A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of Security Council 
Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 428-29 (1998). 
277 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 275 (deciding that states must freeze certain accounts 
“without delay”). 
278 See Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction), No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶¶ 35 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 ILM 32 
(1996) (“[T]he measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not 
exclude other measures. All the Article requires is that they do not involve ‘the use of force.’  It is a 
negative definition.”).  Limits (such as they are) on the Council’s Article 41 authority are instead imposed 
by other portions of the Charter, the principal of proportionality, and (potentially) jus cogens principles.  1 
SIMMA, supra note 203, at 739; T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the 
Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETHERLANDS 
Y.B. INT’L L. 33 (1995). 
279 Some types of Security Council measures are not likely to be used in connection with the 
United States proper – for example, the administration of territory.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 942, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/942 (Sept. 23, 1994) (imposing territorial settlement plan on Bosnian Serbs).  And there has been 
less enthusiasm concerning “offensive” application of the Take Care Clause to purely foreign matters. 
HENKIN, supra note 70, at  52 (“[T]here is nothing to suggest that the ‘take care’ clause was intended to 
extend to violations of international obligations to the United States, committed outside the United States, 
by those not subject to the laws of the United States”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the 
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70-71 (1993) (same). 
280 U.N. CHARTER, art. 27(3). 
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that, unlike Libya, the United States is unlikely to be forced to surrender its nationals for 
criminal trial.281  Yet there remain scenarios that are highly salient to the President’s 
domestic powers.  The Council has increasingly adopted resolutions transcending 
particular crises and particular states,282 and even veto-holders have cause to accept being 
constrained themselves in order to achieve external benefits.  If the United States 
sometimes ratifies multilateral treaties in order to provide marginal support for the 
agreement and for foreign compliance – even when its consent is not necessary to bring 
the treaty into force, and cannot force another state to join – it will be all the more likely 
to make the tradeoff for Security Council legislation that does directly affect the legal 
obligations of other states.283  The recent anti-terrorism initiative fits this description. 
The Security Council also sometimes targets particular Member States at their 
own behest, or at least with their acquiescence.284  While it is highly improbable that a 
President would enable take care authority actually focusing on his or her own 
administration, things do change hands from time to time.  A sitting President just might 
accept a Security Council resolution aimed at a prior administration, or attempt to bind 
the hands of successors.  Either enterprise may run into domestic constraints.  For 
example, a backward-looking decision enabling a foreign or international tribunal to 
investigate and try U.S. war crimes might confront soft norms against using non-
delegated presidential authority for extradition,285 or statutes that create defenses or 
                                                 
281 S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (requiring Libyan compliance with prior requests); 
S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992) (requesting that Libya cooperate with requests for surrender of 
its nationals for trial by other states); Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 39-42 
(Order of Apr. 14) (finding prima facie legal obligation on the part of Libya and the United Kingdom to 
comply with S.C. Res. 748, and denying provisional relief).  
282 For descriptions of this important phenomenon, see Eric Rosand, The Security Council as 
“Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 542 (2005); Paul C. Szasz, 
The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2002); Stefan Talmon, The Security 
Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175 (2005); see also Swaine, Constitutionality, supra note 
13, at 1515-17 (discussing issue and noting prior scholarship).  
283 As an illustration of the former, consider the Chemical Weapons Convention; of the latter, 
consider S.C. Res. 1540.  See supra notes 103, 275. 
284 Thus, for example, the Security Council’s decision ordering the establishment of a Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon at the behest of Lebanon’s President, see S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 
(May 30, 2007), or the arms embargo against Yugoslavia adopted at the behest of Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991).  Other examples are less apposite, such as the many instances 
in which Member States have sought assistance with internal hostilities, or the United Kingdom’s support 
for sanctions against Rhodesia while it was the administering power.  See 1 SIMMA, supra note 203, at 739.  
285 See supra text accompanying note 165 (citing Valentine v. United States).  In contrast to 
Valentine, a Security Council resolution would by hypothesis have provided a binding basis for presidential 
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immunities286 and limit cooperation with certain international tribunals;287 Congress may 
also pretermit (or endorse) authority following a Security Council resolution.288  But 
domestic reversals are no panacea.  Security Council resolutions are distinctly sticky – 
once a Permanent Member’s veto is yielded, and a resolution adopted, attempts to 
overturn it can be stymied by another Member’s veto – which means that a President can 
help establish an international obligation that the United State cannot undo.289  The fact 
that Congress may override the resolution’s domestic effects does not diminish the 
continuing international legal effect, which in turn may influence the exercise of 
Congress’ power. 
Security Council resolutions would still have to satisfy the anti-plenary principle.  
Bracketing the question of congressional defeasance, presidential implementation of an 
order for specific action with respect to war crimes prosecutions – which would be 
subject to international judicial supervision as well – would seem in the abstract to satisfy 
that hurdle.  Whether this is a plausible or generally applicable circumstance is open to 
question.  Resolutions are typically less detailed than are treaties or domestic statutes, and 
the need to achieve consensus among Member States with different legal systems and 
                                                                                                                                                 
action.  And unlike run-of-the-mill cases involving presidential action against individuals not otherwise 
subject to international law, an individual subject to Security Council action may have assumed individual 
responsibility without retaining immunities.  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
2002 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) (noting that the immunity of an incumbent minister of foreign affairs would 
not be retained, inter alia, for certain non-official acts done during the period in office once that period is at 
an end, or before certain international criminal tribunals). 
286 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in 10, 
18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
287 American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), Pub. L. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820, codified at 
22 U.S.C. 7420 et seq. (adopting measures designed to inhibit the involvement of the United States and its 
citizens with the International Criminal Court).  Notably, cooperation with ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals is specifically exempted.  See 22 U.S.C. § 7423.  It seems unreasonable to read this exemption as 
delegating authority to the President, but take care authority may be apt – barring, at least, reasonable 
inferences from other statutes governing cooperation with international tribunals.  See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, § 1342, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 186, 486 
(establishing cooperation with tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia). 
288 The last-in-time rule would credit any such statutes.  Diggs v. Schulz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (refusing to enjoin congressional statute at variance with Security Council resolution imposing trade 
embargo on Rhodesia), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (refusing to enjoin U.S. Department of Commerce from permitting import of sealskins from Namibia 
in violation of Security Council resolution). 
289 U.N. CHARTER, art. 27(3); see Swaine, Constitutionality, supra note 13, at 1538-40, 1609-11 
(discussing problem of “reverse vetoes” in the Security Council and the international delegations issues 
presented). 
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political dispositions often results in compromised terms.290  But successive, clarifying 
resolutions may be easier to arrange than treaty amendments.291  More context-specific 
resolutions are also possible, even if that simultaneously decreases the prospect that the 
United States will subject itself to them.   
The resulting potential of take care authority for Security Council resolutions 
warrants attention, favorable or otherwise, and painstaking review.  If such authority is 
thought too broad, it may motivate revisiting the consensus that a broad range of Security 
Council actions are legally binding, or encourage scrutiny of resolutions to see whether 
they conform to the anti-plenary principle.  Within the Security Council, the United 
States might pursue greater particularity as to the legal grounds for (and desired effect of) 
any action, or show greater caution in expanding the Council’s ambit.  Finally, on the 
home front, Congress’ attention might be invited – perhaps in amending the U.N. 
Participation Act or the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, to cope with 
particular kinds of resolutions, or more generally, as discussed in Part IV below. 
3. Treaties – without decisions.  The example of the Security Council indirectly 
illustrates more pervasive phenomena.  As Security Council resolutions grow more 
ambitious, they begin to usurp the functions of consensual treaty-making,292 thereby 
recalling the basic case: to what does take care authority for treaties amount in the 
absence of any international decision?  For example, if a presidential order simply 
articulated the view that the VCCR required disapplying state procedural default rules, 
without benefit of Avena, would it be given the same weight? 
Absent an international decision, the President’s take care authority relates to the 
treaty’s substance – as opposed to its dispute resolution mechanisms – and as such 
approaches the vexed question of whether the executive branch enjoys Chevron 
                                                 
290 For example, the initial anti-terror resolution, Security Council Resolution 1373, left it to every 
state to define the “terrorist acts” and “funds” that were at its core.  Talmon, supra note 282, at 189-90 
(discussing these and other ambiguities, and exploitation of the definition of terrorism by Syria). 
291 Certainly the procedures are less formal, do not require recourse to domestic processes, and 
involve fewer states.  On the other hand, successive resolutions increase the choke points for any states 
wielding a veto. 
292 Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 874-75 
(2003); see, e.g., Swaine, Constitutionality, supra note 13, at 1517 n.90 (describing debate over this issue 
with S.C. Resolution 1540). 
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deference in treaty interpretation.293  Assuming the framework’s premise makes sense in 
the statutory context, it translates only imperfectly to treaties.294  Claims for strong, 
Chevron-style deference must initially address whether the situation is compatible with 
the fiction that Congress delegated power to act with the force of law.295  Treaties pose 
additional problems at this threshold: treaties cannot be interpreted according to just one 
party, and other states would not have acquiesced in giving the U.S. executive branch a 
trump whenever its interpretation is not unreasonable;296 at the domestic level, it is 
unclear how the Senate and the President could delegate lawmaking authority to the 
President;297 and Chevron may not apply to delegations to the President anyway.298  
Perhaps deference could be redeemed on the basis of expertise, but that could not easily 
justify the conclusive authority given reasonable agency interpretations under Chevron – 
instead crediting only its persuasive force, not unlike the deference given the ICJ299 – and 
                                                 
293 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
294 It is only marginally easier to import those norms for the task of interpreting foreign relations 
statutes.  Compare Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170 (2007), with Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230 (2007). 
295 Under Chevron’s “step one,” courts ask whether a statute is clear.  If not, “step two” inquires 
whether an agency interpretation is reasonable; if it is, the agency view is binding.  Chevron U.S.A., 467 
U.S. at 842-43.  The Supreme Court’s subsequent cases suggest a threshold “step zero” – never consistently 
employed – that must be satisfied before the framework is even applied.  Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 187, 193, 222-28 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Step Zero].  It seems to involve reconsideration of 
whether Congress delegated, though it is widely acknowledged that the whole idea of congressional intent 
to delegate under any given statute is fictive.  Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power 
To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589-91 (2006). 
296 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 705 
(2000); Criddle, supra note 190, at 1930-31; Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty 
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1301 (2002); Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 592 
(2007). 
297 See supra text accompanying note 190. 
298 Compare, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376-79 
(2001) (arguing that presidential involvement enhances case for Chevron deference), with Kevin M. Stack, 
The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006) (arguing against 
Chevron deference to presidential directives in the absence of an express statutory grant of authority). 
299 Compare Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (regarding agency 
pronouncements as “not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority” but nonetheless guiding 
courts and litigants “depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade”), with Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (describing ICJ judgments as 
entitled to “respectful consideration”).  It is possible, however, that Skidmore deference may amount to 
something more, or that Skidmore-class rules may sometimes warrant exceptional treatment.  Long Island 
Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2349-50 (2007) (interpretive rules will ordinarily only 
“persuade” a reviewing court, “but will not necessarily ‘bind’ a reviewing court’”) (emphasis added); id. at 
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seems to encounter the same threshold objections.300  Basing deference on the President’s 
foreign affairs powers, finally, abandons the Chevron framework for new challenges.  
The responsibility to speak for the nation does not readily justify deferring to defer to 
domestic pronouncements,301 and the President’s role in treaty-making scarcely explains 
why we would defer to lawmaking that does not take that form.302 
Take care authority could not supply a complete justification for Chevron in the 
treaty context, since the two domains overlap in a relatively narrow set of circumstances.  
Sometimes take care authority is exercised when issues of deference are irrelevant: for 
example, when the President is simply ensuring that the executive branch itself is acting 
within the law, or when executive branch actions are for constitutional or statutory 
reasons shielded from judicial review.303  When, as in these cases, the propriety of 
executive branch action is not before a court, there is no need to resolve the tug-of-war 
between deference and the responsibility of courts to declare what the law is.304  Take 
care and deference issues do overlap, potentially, when courts are forced to evaluate the 
legal effect of a President’s treaty implementation, but even then the fit is imperfect.  
Because take care authority is germane only when treaty provisions bind the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
2350 (“’[I]interpretive rules ... enjoy no Chevron status as a class’”) (emphasis in original).  The 
difference, in any event, “often won’t matter.”  Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 295, at 229-30.  
300 Some have urged Skidmore-level deference for executive branch treaty interpretation.  
Professor Criddle, for example, suggests that Skidmore, unlike Chevron, applies to “statutes that fall within 
agencies’ expertise but are not congressionally committed to their discretion.”  Criddle, supra note 190, at 
1933-34. If so, this means it would circumvent some problems associated with transplanting Chevron to the 
treaty context.  But the distinction is sharper than the case law probably permits.  Skidmore deference 
seems as much occasioned by other factors (particularly less formal procedures), and dependent on some 
congressional commitment.  E.g., Long Island, 127 S. Ct. at 2349-50 (rejecting argument that “even if the 
third-party regulation is within the scope of the statute's delegation,” it was interpretive and thus entitled 
only to Skidmore deference, by pointing to indications that agency was employing its full rulemaking 
authority); Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 (suggesting Skidmore applies “where statutory circumstances indicate no 
intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority was not 
invoked”) (emphasis added). 
301 Compare Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign 
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 197 (2006) (citing, as basis for 
deference, the President’s role in conducting foreign relations), with Bradley, Chevron, supra note 296, at 
702 (noting problem of non-diplomatic pronouncements). 
302 Compare Ku & Yoo, supra note 301, at 197 (citing, as basis for deference, “the President’s 
unique constitutional role as the maker of treaties under Article II”), with Bradley, supra note 296, at 702 
(“Where does the executive branch obtain the constitutional authority to in effect create law governing 
Article II treaties without first obtaining additional senatorial advice and consent?”). 
303 Deference may, however, animate jurisdictional doctrines.  Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political 
Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 610-14 (1976). 
304 Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 295, at 189 (describing Chevron as “creat[ing] a kind of 
counter-Marbury for the administrative state”). 
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States, the President could not claim take care authority to implement treaties to which 
the United States was not party, nor provisions for which U.S. compliance was not at 
issue.305 
Subject to these qualifications, a Chevron-type perspective – were that favored – 
arguably favors substantial deference in cases of overlap, even in the absence of an 
international decision.  For reasons previously stated, it is difficult to maintain that 
treaties actually or presumptively delegate gap-filling authority to the President, not the 
least because other states are exceedingly unlikely to have licensed foreign officials to 
deviate from the otherwise-preferred understanding of a treaty.  But from a Chevron 
vantage, some kind of delegation – or at least a rebuttable presumption of delegation – is 
most tenable when the only authority being claimed is one to fulfill treaty obligations, 
even if only partway.306   If Congress may fairly be required to correct a broader range of 
potential errors in the administration of domestic statutes, it may not seem unreasonable 
to make treaty-makers oust this far narrower range of presidential authority if it is not to 
their liking.  Additional limits are built into the Chevron framework.  The familiar two-
step analysis excludes presidential action that is excluded by the treaty or in any event 
appears unreasonable,307 the preference for formal agency procedures arguably promotes 
                                                 
305 Sarai v. Rio Tinto PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), for example, reversed a dismissal of an 
Alien Tort Statute action brought against a London-based mining company for activities in Papua New 
Guinea.   The court of appeals accorded “serious weight” to a State Department submission as to the 
disruptive effect of lawsuit, but did not regard it as conclusive as to the basis for judgment – the political 
question doctrine – which it did not directly address.  Id. at 1081-84.  If, on remand, the President were to 
weigh in on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that the company violated the U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, it could not invoke take care authority, since the United States is not a party to UNCLOS – and, 
even if it were, its own fulfillment of the treaty’s obligations would not be at stake. 
306 That assumption would reach its limits, however, if the attempt to fulfill U.S. obligations 
unavoidably imposed a ceiling on U.S. fulfillment or posed a conflict with other treaty provisions.  That is 
unlikely to arise frequently, but it is not beyond reason.  In Sanchez-Llamas, for example, the United States 
suggested that recognizing an individual right for foreign nationals to decide whether to notify their 
consulates would conflict with bilateral agreement that require mandatory notification.  Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21-22, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 
(2006) (Nos. 05-51 & 04-10566).  Supposing that to be so, were the President to implement the VCCR by 
adopting a mandatory notification program, even for those states not benefiting from an extant bilateral 
agreement, that might infringe the individual rights also conferred by the VCCR.   
307 See supra text accompanying note 295. 
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deliberation and accountability,308 and the case law arguably checks self-
aggrandizement.309  
A take care approach is nevertheless superior in assessing the relevant 
considerations, and ultimately more equivocal.  That approach does not dwell on whether 
a treaty or statute hypothetically delegated authority; instead, the Take Care Clause is 
understood to delegate a limited, defeasible authority to ensure, in the absence of contrary 
instruction from the Congress or the Constitution, that treaty obligations are fulfilled.  
The key question then becomes whether according binding authority to presidential 
orders affords an improvident amount of discretion to the President.  Under Chevron, the 
absence of an international decision might actually favor greater deference: it allows 
continued ambiguity that is more consistent with space for delegated gap-filling, and a 
presidential determination might seem more genuine, legitimate, and deliberative if not 
reached under duress.  A take care approach points in the opposite direction, since the 
absence of an international decision diminishes the constraints on presidential 
implementation.  Rather than being pressed for compliance by another institution, the 
occasions for intervention are much more at the President’s election.310  Rather than 
being faced with an essentially binary decision – to comply with an international decision 
or not – the President enjoys greater flexibility in elaborating on the provision’s terms.   
Could binding, Chevron-level authority nonetheless be sustained on a take care 
analysis?  If so, the most promising conditions involve some identifiable capacity for 
course correction.  The most significant factor would be the capacity to legally confront 
an executive order.  Given the difficulty foreign states have in pursuing judicial relief in 
the United States,311 the feasibility of judicial review turns to a substantial degree on 
                                                 
308 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001) (considering Congress’ choice 
of “a relatively formal administrative procedure” to promote “fairness and deliberation”); Sunstein, Step 
Zero, supra note 295, at 225-26. 
309 See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 203, 208-62 (2004) (detailing spectrum of instances in which courts have shown concern about 
agency self-interest in making deference decisions). 
310 It is unlikely, of course, to be totally random: other states may be objecting, or the United 
States may be subject to decisions they regard as non-binding, as were both the case prior to Avena. 
311 In Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999), the Supreme Court cast 
doubt on the ability of foreign states to secure jurisdiction over either the United States or the several states.  
As to the former, the per curiam order noted “imposing threshold barriers”: no evident waiver of U.S. 
sovereign immunity, and doubt whether Article III, § 2, cl. 2 applied when to cases when the German 
citizen involved was not an ambassador or consul.  Id. at 112; see Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 
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whether the treaty provision in question is self-executing – in the sense that it may be 
invoked by individuals in court.312  International recourse – the availability of some 
dispute resolution mechanism, even if it has not (by hypothesis) yet been realized – is 
also salient.  Even an optional mechanism to which the United States is not party may in 
theory temper U.S. positions, given the possibility that it will one day subscribe and open 
its administration of the treaty to scrutiny.  These factors encourage the United States 
toward dispute resolution mechanisms, at least to the extent it believes the mechanism 
will render decisions (favorable to the United States or not) that coincide roughly with 
ends it wishes to promote.  If the United States believed (as it did not) that the VCCR 
constrained state criminal proceedings, expected that the ICJ would agree, and worried 
that it might lack authority in the absence of an ICJ decision, it would not begrudge the 
Optional Protocol. 
Finally, if conclusive deference were somehow owed a presidential order, that 
should be qualified if the order is contrary to an international decision rendered via a 
treaty-based dispute resolution mechanism;313 in that case, the order is at best owed 
Skidmore-level deference based on executive branch expertise.314  The rationale for this 
limitation is straightforward.  Whatever the strength of any positive delegation argument, 
or the basis for resisting claims of implied defeasance under the take care theory, it seems 
especially dubious that treaty-makers would have anticipated that a particular state’s 
government would retain binding authority even in the teeth of contrary, authoritatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
583 n.3 (1943) (noting that “[t]he United States has never been held to be a ‘State’ within this provision”).  
Other bases for action against the United States may exist, but the usual avenues for skirting immunity are 
not available.  See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 195, 199-200 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (holding that 
Tucker Act did not provide basis for action claiming violation of human rights treaty, since such in such 
activities the United States was acting in its sovereign capacity).  But see Garreaux v. United States, 2007 
WL 2193886, *10 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (accepting, for purposes of Indian treaty claim, that the “case is founded 
either upon an ‘Act of Congress’ (if the treaty can be so characterized) or, at least, upon an ‘express or 
implied contract with the United States’”).  As to the states, the Court noted that such a suit was in 
“probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles.”  526 U.S. at 112.  But see Thomas H. Lee, 
The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original 
and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1765 (2004) (arguing for original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions by foreign states claiming 
violations of treaties by U.S. states). 
312 Cf. supra text accompanying note 107 (noting views of Professors Bradley and Sloss).  Of 
course, a treaty may also be non-self-executed but already implemented, which would cure the problem. 
313 This would exclude, for example, decisions rendered by international tribunals or other 
organizations not charged with responsibility by the underlying treaty or its protocols – as when the ICJ, for 
example, construes a treaty in connection with a case established on a different jurisdictional basis.  
314 Cf. Wu, supra note 296, at 590-91 (suggesting Skidmore-level deference as a minimum). 
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rendered decisions.  Whether this defeasance extends to contrary decisions rendered in 
cases not involving the United States, or involving the United States and some third 
party, is certainly debatable; including them may be particularly inappropriate if the 
treaty made clear that decisions had no value as precedent.315  Just as the capacity of 
international decisions to license presidential orders should not be exaggerated, so too 
their capacity to divest domestic capacity. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: TAKING CARE OF LAWMAKING 
This Article’s basic claim is that the Constitution confers limited authority on the 
President as a function of treaty obligations, and that the source of this authority shapes 
and constrains it – as do other laws for which the President is responsible – while 
permitting the United States to fulfill its international commitments.  It has also suggested 
that the scope of executive power conferred by the take care approach is substantially less 
than any imagined by claims based on the President’s foreign affairs powers, and that the 
discretionary component actually compares favorably to any theory of implied 
delegation. 
This said, the consequences of the Take Care Clause may be worrisome, and 
legitimate questions remain as to whether it licenses undue executive branch authority 
relative to other domestic actors, like the U.S. states or Congress.  For this reason, it is 
important to emphasize the opportunities it affords.  As discussed previously, Congress 
sometimes endorses, and sometimes truncates, the President’s authority to implement 
treaties.  The U.N. Participation Act, for example, explicitly permits the President to 
implement certain Security Council resolutions adopted under Article 41 of the Charter; 
at the same time, it rebuts any inference that Congress has delegated authority to 
implement resolutions involving the use of force, and the statutes implementing 
multilateral trade agreements limit both the automatic domestic effect of those 
agreements and their potential for enabling executive branch authority. 
                                                 
315 See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 182, art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”). 
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These varied reactions make it difficult to surmise any particular congressional 
expectation as to the default rule – what authority the President possesses in the absence 
of legislative direction – and likewise impair any factually-premised argument for 
presumptions favoring or disfavoring delegated authority.  But they do suggest that 
Congress is willing to limit presidential authority when it sees fit.  Just so, Congress may 
take matters into its own hands, and resolve them on a case-by-case basis.  It might, for 
example, endorse take care authority as it has with Article 41 resolutions, adding types of 
international institutions and decisions as it sees fit, or truncate take care authority, as it 
has in the trade context.  Prophylactically, U.S. treaty-makers could of course limit the 
opportunities for international intervention and for reinforcement of take care authority, 
whether by bowing out of dispute resolution altogether or requiring specific consent prior 
to any actual proceedings.316 
Congress might also adopt a more overarching approach, addressing treaties or 
international decisions en masse.  It could enact legislation explicitly vesting the 
President with relevant implementing authority, or choose instead a sort of Rules 
(Dis)Enabling Act to prevent treaties or international decisions from licensing executive 
branch authority.  If that were resisted – because, respectively, it ratified freewheeling 
executive authority or impaired interstitial or emergency actions – Congress might take a 
more procedural course.  For example, Congress might require the President to notify it 
of any adverse international decisions, much as it has to provide notice of executive 
agreements,317 require a standstill period before implementing any decisions,318 and limit 
the executive branch’s authority to enter into international settlements or other measures 
that arguably bind U.S. hands. 
                                                 
316 See, e.g., U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 Cong. Rec. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) 
(attaching condition providing that “before any dispute to which the United States is a party may be 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of 
the United States is required in each case”). 
317 Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b; for details of this regime and discussion of its efficacy, 
see CRS, supra note 98, at 209-33. 
318 The analogous Case-Zablocki Act does not require advance notice before executive agreements 
are concluded, but only prompt notice thereafter.  Other statutes do, however, impose waiting periods 
before executive agreements on certain subjects-matter are permitted to take effect.  See CRS, supra note 
98, at 235-38 & table X-3. 
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The danger in any general solution, and the relative virtue of a more piecemeal 
approach, coincides with the original motivations for take care clause authority.  The best 
remedy, on this view, would not focus solely on expanding the capacity to produce 
international legislation, or retracting domestic authority.  The objective of positive law, 
like the Constitution, should instead be to align the allocation of domestic authority with 
the existence of international obligations – as the Take Care Clause permits, but does not 
require. 
 
 
